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THESIS

**RESHAPING THE SWORD AND CHRYSANTHEMUM:
REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF EXPANDING THE
MISSION OF THE JAPAN SELF DEFENSE FORCES**

by

Robert F. Hight Jr.

March 2005

Thesis Co-Advisors:

E.A. Olsen
H.L. Miller

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IMPLICATIONS OF EXPANDING THE MISSION OF THE JAPAN SELF
DEFENSE FORCES**

Robert F. Hight Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.S., Boston University, 1994

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**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 2005**

Author: Robert Frank Hight Jr.

Approved by: Edward A. Olsen
Thesis Co-Advisor

H. Lyman Miller
Thesis Co-Advisor

Douglas Porch
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

Since taking office in 2001, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi has pressed for greater expansion to the mission of the Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF), first by endorsing deployments in support of counter-terrorism operations in the Indian Ocean, and eventually the domestically unpopular decision to deploy to Iraq. Recently, an update to the 1996 National Defense Program Outline was published that accelerated the shift in the mission of the JSDF away from a pure self-defense force capable of operating with the United States in defense of Japan's sovereignty to that of an internationally recognized force capable of conducting operations in varying environments throughout the globe. Japan's accelerated military involvement in world affairs has provoked concerns among neighbors, whose perceptions are often quite different from those of the United States or Japan. Japan's legacy of militarism has created resistance to change among regional partners. In order for changes to succeed without upsetting the regional balance of power, Japan must improve not only the capability, but also the international trust and standing of the JSDF. This thesis provides information to allow policy makers to better understand the challenges that the Government of Japan will face in response to changes in security strategy.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Since taking office in April 2001, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro has pressed for greater expansion of the mission of the Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF), first by endorsing deployments in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in the Indian Ocean, and eventually the domestically unpopular decision to deploy the Japan Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) to Samawah, Iraq.¹ Most recently, on December 10, 2004, the Koizumi administration published an update to the 1996 National Defense Program Outline² (NDPO) and accompanying Mid-Term Defense Plan³ (MTDP). This plan has accelerated the shift in the mission of the Japan Self Defense Force away from a pure self-defense force capable of operating with the United States in defense of Japan's sovereignty to that of an internationally recognized force capable of conducting a wide range of operations in varying geopolitical environments throughout the globe.

This movement for a greater role for the JSDF did not, however, start with Prime Minister Koizumi. Instead it can be traced back to the foundation of the predecessor to the JSDF, the National Police Reserve, in 1954. Over the course of the Cold War the mission of the JSDF evolved to meet the requirements levied on it by Japan's international situation and its strategic partner, the United States. A major acceleration in the pace of changes can be traced to the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, when Japan was strongly criticized by the United States and other Western allies for providing only economic aid. Considering Japan's history of militarism, the aid package was seen in Japan as both generous and appropriate. While the JSDF still has a long way to go both legally and doctrinally before it has the capability to operate militarily as a "normal"

¹ According to a joint Asahi Shimbun and Uruk Shimbun poll in November 2004, 62 percent of Japanese opposed extending the deployment of the JGSDF in Iraq, this is compared to 52 percent who opposed the deployment from a similar poll conducted by Kyodo News in January 2004. Toru Hayano. "Self-Serving Utilization of Opinion Poll Data." *Asahi Shimbun*, December 17, 2004. <http://www.asahi.com/column/hayano/eng/TKY200412170133.html> (accessed December 20, 2004). and *Japan Times*. "51.6% Oppose SDF Dispatch to Iraq but Cabinet Support Up." January 19, 2004. <http://202.221.217.59/print/news/nn01-2004/nn20040119a1.htm> (accessed December 20, 2004).

² In Japanese this was published as: 防衛計画の大綱

³ In Japanese: 中期防衛力整備計画

nation, Japan's accelerated military involvement in world affairs has provoked concerns among regional neighbors, whose perceptions are often quite different from those of the United States or Japan.

The JSDF is already one of the most technologically advanced militaries in the world. Therefore, developing a regional or global presence will not require major defense acquisitions. The key to developing an internationally recognized military presence will be gradual changes in capabilities and, more importantly, mission. Japan's legacy of militarism and abuses in Asia will create resistance to change among the regional partners. In order for changes to succeed without upsetting the regional balance of power, Japan must improve not only the capability, but also the international acceptance and standing of the Self Defense Forces. It also must be stressed that creating a viable military does not mean that Japan will have to return to a path of militarism.

A. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENTS

This thesis investigates causal factors in determining how the changing mission of the JSDF affects the regional balance of power. It also identifies the main regional obstacles in expanding the role and capabilities of the JSDF through a review of historical reactions to acquisition of new capabilities and missions by the JSDF. Changes in the JSDF missions since 1991 are compared in light of the perceived motivation for change, broken into the categories of globalist, regionalist and nationalist. In addition, changes in capabilities and policy can be also divided into security or stability oriented categories. Reaction to changes of mission and doctrine have been seen differently by the various regional powers, mission changes accepted as a stabilizing force by South Korea are often seen as a direct challenge by China. In addition to studying defense policy, significant non-military political issues, such as visits by Prime Minister Koizumi to Yasukuni Jinja and the government approval of controversial history textbooks can complicate efforts to improve the trust and standing of the JSDF.

B. ASSUMPTIONS

In developing this thesis the following assumptions have been made throughout. First, Japan must remain committed to a doctrine that renounces the right to belligerency of a state. Although some statements by senior government officials have indicated a

belief in Japan's right to preempt an attack on itself, adoption of a policy similar to the United States preventive war strategy would seriously upset the regional balance of power. Second, Japan must continue to condemn the use and possession of nuclear weapons. Even if nuclear weapons were developed in response to a nuclear armed and capable North Korea, a nuclear-armed Japan would almost certainly trigger a nuclear arms race in the rest of Asia. Third, the United States–Japan security alliance must continue with no significant changes to the United States security guarantee. Although changes in the United States' Far East force structure will undoubtedly emerge in the near term, the commitment to the defense of Japan should never be in doubt. Fourth, it is assumed that Japan will not be subject to a major terrorist attack similar to that occurring in the United States on September 11, 2001. Such an attack would likely provide justification for strongly nationalistic forces in Japan to push a more active “Japan First” defense policy agenda.

C. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY

This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter II provides an outline of the evolution of the JSDF. The main focus is on changes taking place since 1991, with special emphasis on the 1996 and 2004 National Defense Program Outlines and the associated Mid-Term Defense Reviews. It is important to not only understand the changes called for in these documents, but also how the implementation has been carried out as perceptions can change based on whether the changes are based on a global, regional or nationalist framework. This provides the basis for understanding the reactions by countries profiled in Chapter III and Chapter IV.

Chapter III addresses how interaction between Japan and North Korea has changed due to increased military capability, an expansion of the mission of the JSDF, as well as how non-military issues have upset the security relationships. Japan justifies many steps on countering a perceived threat by North Korea. Incidents involving the launch of a Taepo Dong missile in 1998, as well as incursions into Japanese waters by North Korean motherships, the acknowledgment of Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korea and the recent nuclear crisis have fueled an antagonistic relationship between Japan and North Korea that could affect the regional security balance.

Chapter IV analyzes China's reaction to JSDF expansion. As a growing power in Asia and the world, China is increasingly interacting with Japan in economic and military matters. This interaction consists of both competition against and cooperation with Japan. This chapter studies what events have led to a confrontation with China and how China views the role of the JSDF in global and regional affairs, as well as Chinese fears of Japanese involvement in a Taiwan Strait crisis.

Chapter V examines the relationship between South Korea and Japan. While a shared adversary in North Korea has historically helped to improve Japan-South Korea relations, continuation of South Korea's "Sunshine Policy" has undermined this relationship. South Korea's view of Japan differs starkly from that of either North Korea or China, and thus South Korea's reaction to Japan's "normalization" efforts differs greatly from its neighbors.

Chapter VI summarizes the findings and present conclusions. This chapter also outlines decisions that the Government of Japan will face in the near term in deciding on what role Japan will take in world and regional affairs. This assessment is intended to allow policy makers to better understand the challenges that the Government of Japan will face in the next few years. In addition, an analysis is presented of ways that the United States and Japan can work together to ensure that the new force expands the capability of the government of Japan to react to regional and global crises without upsetting the balance of power in Asia.

II. THE CHANGING MISSION FOR THE JAPAN SELF DEFENSE FORCES

Although the role of the JSDF has evolved since the founding of the National Police Reserve in 1954, these changes have been much more pronounced since 1991. In order to understand the regional implications of these changes, they must be analyzed in light of the perceived domestic or international motivation for change, broken into the categories of global, regional and national as well as identified as security or stability oriented in nature. Using this methodology matrix, future changes can be examined in accordance with their expected impact on foreign relations. It is important to not only understand changes in published doctrine or orders of battle, but also the process by which the implementation is carried out. Often regional reaction is shaped not by introduction of a new system or doctrine, but the perception that regional neighbors formulate during the actual introduction of new systems and implementation of new doctrines.

A. THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF THE JSDF

The surrender of Japan in 1945 led to both a culture of anti-militarism in Japan and a fear of a future militaristic emergence by Japan's regional neighbors. Internally, as the military lost control of the security situation in Japan the people turned their backs on the military, but simultaneously continued to fear becoming the victim of foreign powers. As Karl Van Wolferen explained it, "A common Japanese term, *higaisha ishiki* (victimhood consciousness), reflects a diffuse but fairly strong sense that the world cannot be trusted and that Japan will always be a potential victim of capricious external forces."⁴ With the arrival of American troops, the Japanese people looked to not only "reconstructing buildings but also rethinking what it meant to speak of a good life and a good society."⁵ Soon the occupation authority set about the task of redefining Japan. On 11 October 1945, General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied

⁴ Karel Van Wolferen, "No Brakes, No Compass," *The National Interest* 26 (1991): 26. For a study of how *higaisha ishiki* ties into modern Japanese business dealings see Robert M. March, *The Japanese Negotiator: Subtlety and Strategy Beyond Western Logic* (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1988).

⁵ John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co./New Press, 1999), 25.

Powers, met with the new Japanese premier, Shidehara Kijuro, to order the complete “liberalization of the constitution” with the extension of rights to women, promotion of labor unions, open liberal schools and most important to Japan’s future role in world affairs, the adoption of what would become Article IX of the Constitution which “forever renounced war as a sovereign right of a nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.”⁶

Japan was initially relegated to the role of a disarmed neutral nation, but the communist revolution in China, the outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula and a growing Cold War with the Soviet Union reinforced to the Japanese and United States governments the requirement to establish a strong ally in East Asia. By July 1950, changes to the interpretation of Article IX had already started with the formation of a 75,000 member National Police Reserve, intent on maintaining internal peace and order, not on protecting Japan from outside aggression.⁷ This force eventually was renamed into the Japan Self Defense Forces in July 1954.⁸ The JSDF were created under strict bureaucratic control and authorized to use force “only in cases that meet the so-called three necessities conditions of self-defense: when there has been a sudden and unjustifiable aggression against Japan, when there is no other means to cope with this aggression than the use of the right of self-defense, and when the use of the right of self-defense is kept within the necessary minimum.”⁹ Neither the United States nor other nations were eager to see a remilitarized and independent Japan emerge. In order to ensure that Japan did not feel unduly threatened by instability in the region, the United States developed a series of security guarantees with Japan.

The 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which outlined the roles of United States Forces in protecting Japan, was a key part of this system. It reinforced the United States’ role in protecting Japan, specifically in Articles V and VI. In Article V of

⁶ Hugh Borton, *Japan's Modern Century* (New York: Ronald Press, 1955), 491.

⁷ Masamichi Royama, “Problems in Self-Defense,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 308, Japan Since Recovery of Independence (1956): 167.

⁸ *Nihon Boueichou* (Japan Defense Agency), “Defense of Japan 1999,” (Tokyo: Defense Agency, 1999), 311-312.

⁹ *Nihon Boueichou* (Japan Defense Agency), “Defense of Japan 1982,” (Tokyo: Defense Agency, 1982), 69.

the treaty, the United States Forces Japan's area of responsibility was declared as “the land areas of the Japanese archipelago and the adjoining sea areas.” Article VI further provided the United States “use of facilities in Japan for maintaining regional security.”¹⁰ To reinforce Japan’s peaceful status in world security affairs, the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” of not possessing, not manufacturing and not introducing nuclear weapons into Japan was developed, principles that Japan still strongly holds on to today.

B. JAPAN’S COLD WAR ROLE

Although the security agreement with the United States provided basic protection to Japan, an American presence was not always embraced. For example, during the Johnson administration, relations with the Japanese revolved primarily around the war in Vietnam. This created extreme tension as the Japanese public was strongly opposed to the war and Johnson was displeased with Japan’s reluctance to involve itself more actively in Asian security affairs. This tension was partially resolved at the 1967 Johnson-Sato summit when Prime Minister Sato Eisaku agreed to support the U.S. position in return for greater Japanese involvement in Okinawa.¹¹ This was taken a step further in the 1969 Nixon-Sato summit when Japan agreed to recognize its own interest in maintaining security in the region in exchange for the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese jurisdiction, which finally occurred in 1972. The recognition by Japan of its own security responsibilities, however, was not enough for the Nixon administration, which saw a greater need for Asian states to provide for their own defense. The “Nixon Doctrine,”¹² as it came to be called, emphasized the belief that while the United States would assist in maintaining a nation’s security, it was that nation’s primary responsibility to provide for its own defense. While formulated from the American experiences in Vietnam, it also, in the Nixon administration’s view, applied to Japan. Both the surprise resumption of relations with China and the various economic policies of the Nixon administration aimed at reducing Japan’s mercantilist approach to trade were efforts to bring Japan closer to

¹⁰ “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan.” 1960. <http://usfj.mil/references/treaty1.html> (accessed 24 November 2004).

¹¹ Rust M. Deming, “The Changing American Government Perspective on the Missions and Strategic Focus of the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” in *The Future of America’s Alliances in Northeast Asia*, ed. Michael H. Armacost and Daniel I. Okimoto (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2004), 56.

¹² Initially known as the “Guam Doctrine” in recognition of the site of its original proclamation in 1969.

normalizing its status in the international community. Relations between Washington and Tokyo were not, however, always confrontational. The Nixon administration supported Japan's accelerated normalization of relations with Beijing, allowed Japan to break from U.S. policy during the 1973 OPEC crisis. President Nixon's administration also was the first to express support for Japan becoming a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.¹³ Even with these efforts to "normalize" Japan's military and security capabilities, it became increasingly evident that they remained inadequate.

Japan's vulnerability was highlighted on September 6, 1976 when Soviet Air Force Lieutenant Viktor Belenko flew his MiG-25 to Hakodate airfield in Hokkaido. This erupted into a major international incident as the United States and Japan quickly dismantled the aircraft to study its construction and capabilities. While the return of the aircraft not only caused major tension between the Soviet Union, Japan and the United States, it also brought to light the vulnerability of the Japanese air defense system. The Japanese Air Self Defense Force was not able to launch aircraft in time to intercept the Soviet aircraft. This embarrassment helped to fuel calls for greater funding for air defense capabilities and the development of Japan's "reconnaissance power."¹⁴

The month after the MiG-25 incident the National Defense Council and the Cabinet approved the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO). While not directing the institution of major changes in the organization or equipment of the Self Defense Forces, the 1976 NDPO did establish "the most appropriate defense goal" as being the "maintenance of a full surveillance posture in peacetime and the ability to cope effectively with situations up to the point of limited and small scale aggression."¹⁵ It placed particular emphasis on the Air Self Defense Force's capability to maintain "vigilance and surveillance throughout Japanese airspace" and to be able to take

¹³ Deming, "The Changing American Government Perspective on the Missions and Strategic Focus of the U.S.-Japan Alliance," 57.

¹⁴ Joseph M. Ha and John Guinasso, "Japan's Rearmament Dilemma: The Paradox of Recovery," *Pacific Affairs* 53, no. 2 (1980): 253.

¹⁵ *Nihon Boueichou* (Japan Defense Agency), "Defense of Japan 1991," (Tokyo: Defense Agency, 1991), 200.

immediate and appropriate steps against violations of Japanese airspace...”¹⁶ This also led to the acquisition of F-15 fighters from the United States the following year and the E-2C airborne surveillance aircraft in 1979.¹⁷

Even with these improvements in capability, Japan was still dependent on the United States for maintaining an overall strategic deterrence to the Soviet Union. This was further exposed in 1977 when the Carter administration proposed removing U.S. forces from the Korean peninsula without a *quid pro quo* from the Soviet Union. Although heavy pressure from Japan forced the Carter administration to back away from its proposal, the seeds of doubt over the U.S. commitment to Japanese security were firmly planted in Japanese strategic thinkers. Japan’s views on security changed further with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and buildup of Soviet forces in the Far East. The Reagan administration saw Japan as a key partner in containing the “evil empire” and pushed Japan to take more responsibility in maintaining international security. Pressure from the United States led Japan to break the 1 percent of GNP limit imposed on defense spending, share military technology with the United States and even consider joining in the development of a missile defense system.¹⁸ The election of Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro in 1982, a long time supporter of a strong Japanese defense program, accelerated changes. His summits with President Reagan in January and May of 1983 solidified the U.S.–Japan security relationship.¹⁹ Japan was eager to present itself as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” to the Soviet Union and the United States reciprocated by demanding a global “zero based” solution to international security.²⁰

C. JAPAN’S CHANGING POST-COLD WAR ROLE

Although Japan’s neo-mercantilist trade policy in the 1980s was increasingly at odds with the United States, it found that the large influx of capital allowed Japan to

¹⁶ *Nihon Boueichou* (Japan Defense Agency), “Defense of Japan 1991,” 203.

¹⁷ *Nihon Boueichou* (Japan Defense Agency), “Defense of Japan 1999,” 317.

¹⁸ Deming, “The Changing American Government Perspective on the Missions and Strategic Focus of the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” 58-59.

¹⁹ The personal relationship between President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone was so close that it came to be called the Ron-Yasu relationship. For recollections by Prime Minister Nakasone on the relationship see: <http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20040708-61.html>

²⁰ Deming, “The Changing American Government Perspective on the Missions and Strategic Focus of the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” 59.

conduct its own *kinken gaiko* (checkbook diplomacy), which focused on Japan providing economic instead of security support during times of crisis abroad. This policy continued to be the main source of international representation up until the 1991 Gulf War. Japan's inability to deploy even military support or medical forces during the build up and its deployment of minesweepers long after hostilities ended met with strong criticism in the United States and Europe.²¹ While understanding of the cultural and legal limits of deploying forces, Washington saw Japan's passive response as disappointing, considering Japan's dedication to the "[United Nations], the rule of law, and stability in the Middle East."²² Since then, Japan has embarked on a program to internationalize its Self Defense Forces through United Nations sponsored Peace Keeping Operations, exercises with foreign countries, increased foreign port visits and, most recently, support for the U.S.-led coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Although legislation was introduced to the Diet in the fall of 1990 to allow a more active role for the JSDF in the Middle East, it was hastily constructed and easily defeated by opposition in the upper house.²³ This embarrassment due to political inaction caused Japan to seriously reconsider its position in world affairs. As the 1990s progressed, the "Japan problem" debate in the United States continued, with many Americans complaining of Japan's unwillingness to provide support in military security, while simultaneously providing a challenge to the U.S. economy. At the same time many critics in Japan were afraid that removing restrictions on the deployment of Self Defense Forces overseas would lead inevitably to a resurgence of militarism, effectively letting the Japanese "genie out of the bottle." Ironically, the approval to deploy aircraft for refugee support (later cancelled) and minesweepers to assist in opening waterways occurred not through democratic debate, but instead through justifications of existing laws.²⁴

²¹ Francis Fukuyama and Kong Dan Oh, *The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship after the Cold War* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1993), 17.

²² Deming, "The Changing American Government Perspective on the Missions and Strategic Focus of the U.S.-Japan Alliance," 61.

²³ Jiro Yamaguchi, "The Gulf War and the Transformation of Japanese Constitutional Politics," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 18, no. 1 (1992): 165.

²⁴ Yamaguchi, "The Gulf War and the Transformation of Japanese Constitutional Politics," 166-167.

D. JAPAN'S ACTIVE DEFENSE POLICY

Following the Gulf War embarrassment, Japan began to look for new ways to balance the military and economic aspects of Japan's security policy. In 1995 Japan published an update to the 1976 NDPO. The 1995 NDPO was intended to move Japan away from the Cold War deployment and capabilities and to develop a "flexible defense capability that can respond to various situations."²⁵ Particularly important was the redistribution of forces in Japan, with a reduction in the Japan Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) to 147,000 from 167,000 and redistribution from major concentrations in Hokkaido to a greater balance throughout all areas of Japan. In addition, both the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) and Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) saw a reduction in active units.²⁶ The emphasis of this revision, however, still was on a Cold War-type conflict.

Japan's greater role in international affairs continued to change with the publication of the 1997 revised Guidelines for Defense Cooperation between the United States and Japan. This agreement detailed the types of assistance that Japan would provide in the event of a regional contingency, including rear area support, intelligence sharing, and bilateral planning.²⁷ A new concept was introduced in the agreement that detailed cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (SIASJ), which allowed Japan to start looking farther away from the immediate vicinity of Japan to other geographic areas that could have an important influence on Japan's peace and security. It also indicated Japan's greater willingness to participate in regional security operations and contingencies, such as direct support to the United States during a Korean peninsula conflict. Finally, the new guidelines reinforced that any Self Defense Force operations would be conducted in strict accordance to constitutional limitations.²⁸

The 1995 NDPO was augmented in December 2000 with the approval of the Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) for FY 2001-2005. The new MTDP built on many of the

²⁵ Seong-Tae Hong, ed., *The Strategic Balance in Northeast Asia, 2003* (Seoul: Korea Research Institute for Strategy, 2003), 146.

²⁶ *Nihon Boueichou* (Japan Defense Agency), "Defense of Japan 1991," 246-247.

²⁷ *Nihon Boueichou* (Japan Defense Agency), "Defense of Japan 1991," 279-286.

²⁸ *Nihon Gaimushou* (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs). "The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation." 1997. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html>.

pre-existing initiatives, but it increased emphasis on protecting Japan from various forms of attacks, such as guerilla-commando raids, ballistic missile defense, evacuation of Japanese nationals overseas, intelligence, sustainability and survivability.²⁹ The MTDP was, however, careful to not name any particular countries of concern and kept the source of threats thinly veiled.

The greatest shift in Japanese security thinking occurred after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. Japan reacted quickly to offer support to the United States and provided extensive security to U.S. military bases in Japan. Also, as it became obvious that the United States would be conducting strikes in Afghanistan, Japan offered logistics support to US forces. The attacks on the Pentagon and New York showed Japan that security could no longer be guaranteed by the United States. This realization was further emphasized in December 2001 when the Japanese Coast Guard intercepted a North Korean spy ship. After the North Korean boat opened up with automatic fire and possibly with a rocket-propelled grenade, the spy ship was sunk.

A greater emphasis on indigenous defense capability was soon called for across the spectrum of Japanese government. Comparing Japan's stated goals from the end of the Cold War to those stated more recently shows just how far Japan has come in its security thinking. In 1994, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Diplomatic Bluebook listed the main goals of Japan as to strengthen the functions of the United Nations and increase trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States and Europe.³⁰ By 2003 the MOFA Diplomatic Bluebook listed the primary goals of Japan as to firmly maintain the Japan-US Security Arrangements, moderately build up Japan's defense capability on an appropriate scale and pursue diplomatic efforts to ensure international peace and security.³¹ Japan has also been more active in regional and global affairs following September 2001. Security dialogues, such as the recent six-party talks to

²⁹ *Nihon Boueichou* (Japan Defense Agency). "Defense of Japan 2001 (Summary)." *Defense Agency*, 2001. <http://www.jda.go.jp/e/pab/wp2001/index.html> (accessed December 2, 2004).

³⁰ *Nihon Gaimushou* (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs). "The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation."

³¹ *Nihon Gaimushou* (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs). "2004 Diplomatic Bluebook." 2004. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/index.html> (accessed December 16, 2004).

resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis and the 2003 Iraqi reconstruction meetings in Tokyo, have emphasized Japanese participation in security affairs. These efforts have brought praise by many nations but also raised questions about what the desired role Japan should adopt in world affairs.

E. THE ROAD AHEAD FOR JAPAN'S SECURITY POLICY

The most recent controversy has involved approval of a new National Defense Program Outline³², Mid-Term Defense Review and the subsequent announcement by Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Hosoda Hiroyuki on the relaxation of Japan's arms exports ban to enable sales of missile defense components to the United States.³³ The new outline reduces the authorized strength of the JGSDF to 155,000, a decrease of 5,000 troops, and a further strengthening of the United States–Japan alliance.³⁴ It places greater emphasis on creating a force able to respond to new threats such as terrorism and ballistic missile attacks. The document also points to North Korea's military moves as “a significantly unstable factor in regional security and a serious problem for global nonproliferation efforts.”³⁵ The previous outline in 1995 had avoided referring to specific countries of concern by name. In addition to the updated NDPO, the Cabinet also approved the next MTDP for fiscal years 2005-09 which among other things cut the five-year budget from ¥25.16 trillion to ¥24.24 trillion.³⁶

F. WHAT IS A “NORMAL” NATION?

The Government of Japan has indicated its intention to continue the evolution of the military missions of the JSDF to create a viable international military force that can assist not only in peace keeping and eventually in peace enforcing but quite possibly even in peace making operations throughout the globe. The underlying question has asked

³² Although the name of the document has not changed in Japanese, the NDPO is now being referred to as the National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG) in JDA publications. For consistency, this paper will continue to use NDPO to refer to the document.

³³ *Xinhuanet*. “Japan Unveils Defense Program Outline, Eases Arms Export Ban.” December 10, 2004. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-12/10/content_2317154.htm (accessed December 11, 2004).

³⁴ *Nihon Boueichou* (Japan Defense Agency), “*Bouei Keikaku no Taiko* (National Defense Program Outline),” (Tokyo: 2004).

³⁵ *People's Daily Online*. “Japan's New Defense Outline to be Effective from April 2005.” December 10, 2004. http://english.people.com.cn/200412/10/eng20041210_166858.html (accessed December 11, 2004).

³⁶ *Nihon Boueichou* (Japan Defense Agency), “*Chuki Boueiryoku Seibi Keikaku* (Mid-Term Defense Program Outline),” (Tokyo: 2004).

why Japan sees the need for such an international role. Debate has gone much beyond the initial dialogue of the 1990s about whether Japan's role was in bridging the gap between East and West or setting an example for both. Instead, Japan as the second largest national economy in the world, sees itself increasingly in a regional and global leadership role. Japan is actively seeking a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and as such sees the need for a more active role in security affairs. This has led to greater concern by many nations about whether Japan can do so while maintaining a constitution that renounces the right to belligerency. In order to address these concerns, Japan began to try to raise the international acceptance and standing of the JSDF through exercises and exchanges and the deployment of peacekeeping forces under a United Nations charter.

G. CASE STUDIES

In order to establish a consistent basis to assess reaction to changes in the Self Defense Force mission, six case studies will be examined in the next three chapters. They are: establishment of a ballistic missile defense; participation in counter terrorism operations in the Indian ocean; deployment of the JSDF to Iraq, participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); disaster relief following the December 2004 tsunami in South and Southeast Asia; and historical issues such as visits by Prime Minister Koizumi to Yasukuni Jinja (Yasukuni Shrine) and the publishing of controversial history textbooks. Each case study will be assessed according to the type of mission (stability or security) and the framework under which it is carried out (global, regional or national). These examples provide a sample of changes that have occurred over the last few years in order to demarcate trends. They are not intended to be an all-inclusive list of significant international events.

1. Counter-terrorism Operations in the Indian Ocean

The deployment of the Japanese forces overseas has been controversial since the publishing of a joint communiqué between the United States and Japan issued during the visit of Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru on September 1, 1955 that declared the principle of the “progressive withdrawal of American forces, contingent upon Japan becoming strong enough to contribute substantially to her own defense,” as well as

implying an eventual deployment of Japanese forces overseas.³⁷ The debate intensified in the early 1990s over which forces were appropriate for Tokyo to send in support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The criticism of Japan's slow response with actual forces created a great debate, not only in Japan, but also the region. This debate slowly eroded with the deployment of JSDF troops to Cambodia in 1993 and subsequent participation in numerous global peacekeeping and disaster relief operations. (See Appendix B) While these forces were assigned to provide basic humanitarian and security assistance, they were never involved, even indirectly, in major combat operations. This taboo changed quickly following the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. Japan's pledge of the assistance of the JMSDF and JASDF to the United States in the war on terrorism broke new ground and resuscitated an old controversy about the JSDF—whether forces should be deployed overseas. Eventually the Cabinet approved and the Diet passed the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law.³⁸ The law provided for support to the United States through supply, transportation, repair, maintenance, medical support and rear area support in Japan.³⁹ Even in the face of domestic and international criticism, the JMSDF deployed to the Indian Ocean to assist in logistics with U.S. and, later, coalition forces conducting operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Although Japan never participated directly in combat operation, its supply ships were directly supporting those vessels that did. This acceptance of a *global* responsibility to help maintain *security* has been met with a mixed response from nations in Asia. A key distinction in this operation is that pursuit of the war in Afghanistan by the United States and a “coalition of the willing” had international legitimacy under United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1368. The legality of Japan's deployment in this instance, under the Japanese Constitution, however, has been extensively questioned.

2. Iraqi Stability Operations

The deployment to the Indian Ocean in support of a multi-national effort was not as controversial as the decision to deploy the JGSDF to Iraq to support stability

³⁷ Royama, “Problems in Self-Defense,” 172.

³⁸ In Japanese: テロ対策特別措置法

³⁹ *Nihon Boueichou* (Japan Defense Agency), “Defense of Japan 2003,” (Tokyo: Defense Agency, 2003), 459.

operations with the United States–led coalition in December 2003. Although the JGSDF had deployed numerous forces overseas in support of United Nations–approved operations, this was the first deployment of ground forces outside such a framework. On December 9, 2003, the Diet passed the “Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq.”⁴⁰ This law limited the JSDF personnel only to carrying out the activities of humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, including medical services, water supply, rehabilitation and maintenance of utilities without the use force and only in those areas where combat is not taking place. In addition, forces are strictly mandated not to use their weapons, except in cases of self-defense.⁴¹ As a result of the policy implementation the JGSDF, JMSDF and JASDF deployed personnel and equipment to areas around As Samawah, airport facilities in Basrah, Baghdad, Balad and Mosul, as well as the port facilities in Umm Qasr. Such a deployment in direct support of the United States was especially worrisome to some, as it indicated Japan’s willingness to follow the United States on issues not supported in the United Nations and even questionable under the current constitutional framework.

Similar to the Indian Ocean deployments of the JSDF, deployments to Iraq are being conducted under a *global* framework. Although diplomatic Japan’s support for the United States led war in Iraq may indicate this as a security related event, the government of Japan has been very careful to emphasize the *stability* aspect of this mission. The JSDF is not deployed to an area of high threat and have been working to rebuild the local community. The JSDF is not involved in counterinsurgency operations either actively or in support roles. This matter is, however, complicated by questions about the legitimacy of the Iraq war in the first place. The United States was not able to receive UNSC backing, and many European nations actively opposed the war. Greater European involvement in post-conflict reconstruction is also providing more legitimacy to the current mission as a stability, rather than as a security mission.

⁴⁰ In Japanese: イラクにおける人道復興支援活動及び安全確保支援活動の実施に関する特別措置法

⁴¹ Junichiro Koizumi. “The Outline of the Basic Plan regarding Response Measures Based on the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq.” *Nihon Kantei*, December 9, 2003. http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2003/031209housin_e.html (accessed December 28, 2004).

3. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

On May 31, 2003 President George W. Bush announced the formation of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as part of a global effort to interdict shipments of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), delivery systems, and related materials. Although listed as an initiative, not an organization with membership, 11 countries formally adopted the PSI on September 4, 2003.⁴² The PSI differs from a more proactive counter-proliferation strategy in that, in instances of suspected transport of contraband material, states are encouraged to:

Not transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes, and not to allow any personnel subject to their jurisdiction to do so.

Board and search any vessel flying their flag in their internal waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial sea of any other state.

Provide consent to other nations to board and search any vessel flying their flag.

To stop and/or search in their internal waters, territorial seas, of contiguous zones (when declared) vessels that are reasonably suspect.

To require aircraft transiting their airspace to land for inspection and seize any such cargoes that are identified.⁴³

Although not directly supported by the United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1540, adopted unanimously in April 2004, affirmed the “resolve to take appropriate and effective actions against any threat to international peace and security caused by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery...”⁴⁴ Consistent with this and the above list, PSI interdictions are conducted only with government consent in territorial waters and, on the high seas, only with flag-country approval. The first PSI exercise was hosted by Australia in September 2003 in

⁴² Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States

⁴³ United States Department of State. “The Proliferation Security Initiative.” *Bureau of Nonproliferation*, July 28, 2004. <http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/other/34726.htm> (accessed February 9, 2005).

⁴⁴ United Nations. “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.” April 28, 2004. <http://disarmament2.un.org/Committee1540/index.html> (accessed February 9, 2005).

the Coral Sea with another exercise hosted by Japan in October 2004 that included observers from Thailand, the Philippines, Cambodia, New Zealand and fourteen other nations.⁴⁵

Since inception, the list of nations that have signed on to the PSI has grown to over 60, including perhaps most significantly being Russia, which approved the framework on May 31, 2004 after the initial reservation that the PSI would enhance the U.S. ability to act unilaterally against Russian shipping.⁴⁶ Although the PSI is a global initiative, Japanese involvement has specific *regional security* consequences, especially unambiguously with respects to about North Korea's role as a WMD proliferator. The counter-proliferation techniques adopted under the PSI are intended to increase security by curbing the spread of WMD components and precursors.

4. Tsunami Relief

Japan's most recent support to *regional stability* operations followed the December 26, 2004 Aceh earthquake and tsunami that devastated large areas of Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka and India. Tokyo was quick to pledge economic assistance as well as dispatch the JSDF to the area to assist in relief operations. While this dispatch appeared on the surface to be similar to other deployments for disaster relief, such as to East Timor, there is a significant change in the command and control structure of this operation. Prior to this disaster, the largest dispatch of forces for humanitarian relief was 400 JSDF personnel dispatched to Turkey in 1999.⁴⁷ The total number of JSDF personnel engaged in disaster relief activities in Indonesia is approximately 970, with approximately 230 personnel from the JGSDF, approximately 640 personnel from the JMSDF, approximately 90 personnel from the JASDF and another 20 personnel from the Joint Staff Office (JSO).⁴⁸ More importantly the JMSDF

⁴⁵ *Economist.com*. "No Place to Hide, Maybe." *From the Economist Print Edition*, October 28, 2004. http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=3336512 (accessed December 10, 2004).

⁴⁶ This likely brings up memories of the United States' seizure of the Russian flagged tanker Volgoneft-147 for violating Iraqi sanctions by U.S. Naval Forces in the Arabian Gulf in February 2000 that caused extreme embarrassment for the Russian government.

⁴⁷ Brad Glosserman. "Japan Seizes the Moment." *The Japan Times Online*, January 17, 2005. <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/geted.pl5?eo20050117bg.htm> (accessed February 8, 2005).

⁴⁸ Embassy of Japan to Indonesia. "Disaster Relief Activities by Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) in Indonesia." January 23, 2005. http://www.id.emb-japan.go.jp/news05_11e.html (accessed February 8, 2005).

deployed the amphibious ship *Kunisaki*, destroyer *Kurama* and fast supply ship *Tokiwa* to the Bander Aceh region. This has allowed the *Kunisaki* to be used as a command and control platform from which JGSDF helicopters and personnel deploy every morning, returning to the ship at the end of the day.⁴⁹

This situation is being used as a test case for the creation of a Joint Command structure similar to the United States' Joint task Force (JTF). Currently the JSO holds a coordinating, not command, position with regard to the services. As Japan increases its overseas presence, a more efficient command structure will need to be utilized. Hence, what appears to be a simple disaster relief operation is in actuality the test case for a radically new operational doctrine for the JSDF.

5. Ballistic Missile Defense

Following the launch of a Taepo Dong ballistic missile over Japan by North Korea in August 1998, Japan began to push forward on the development and deployment of a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system. The formal decision to join in the United States Navy Theater Wide Defense System (NTWD) was made by the Cabinet on December 25, 1998,⁵⁰ although Japan had initially signed on to assist in research of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) during the Reagan administration⁵¹ and had allocated substantial funds for research and development of some capabilities since that time. The initial decision to develop a missile defense system likely came about in April 2003, following North Korea's official withdrawal from the NPT.⁵² While rumor and speculation continued through the summer, the exact extent of this program was officially announced on December 19, 2003 when the Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo announced the intent to develop a new NDPO that increase funding for the research, development and deployment of a BMD system.⁵³ When the NDPO was unveiled in

⁴⁹ Keibun Goto. "Just Shipshape: All Aboard." *Asahi Shimbun*, February 5, 2005.
<http://www.asahi.com/english/world/TKY200502050172.html> (accessed February 10, 2005).

⁵⁰ *Nihon Boueichou* (Japan Defense Agency), "Defense of Japan 2003," 454.

⁵¹ Tsuneo Akaha, "Japan's Comprehensive Security Policy," *Asian Survey* 31, no. 4 (1991): 325.

⁵² Victor D. Cha. "'Containment Lite'." In *Comparative Connections, Pacific Forum CSIS*, 2nd Quarter 2003. http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0302Qjapan_skorea.html (accessed February 19, 2005).

⁵³ Yasuo Fukuda. "Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on Japan's Preparedness to Respond to National Emergencies." *Nihon Kantei*, December 19, 2003.
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/tyokan/2003/1219danwa_e.html (accessed January 5, 2005).

December 2004, Secretary Fukuda also announced the relaxation of Japan's "Three Principles of Arms Exports" to allow for joint research and development exclusively with the United States "under the condition that strict control is maintained."⁵⁴

North Korea's Taepo Dong missile is not Japan's only justification for establishing a missile defense system. While North Korea's No Dong 1 & 2 missiles are also able to range Japan, Tokyo is increasingly wary of China's ballistic missile capabilities. Although it is unlikely that China could directly threaten the Japanese mainland in the event of a regional conflict, Chinese DF-21, DF-25 and DF-3 missiles can range Japan in its entirety. (Figure 1)




Figure 1. North Korean and Chinese Ballistic Missiles Capable of Reaching Japan⁵⁵

⁵⁴ The Three Principles of Arms Exports states that no exports shall not be permitted to communist bloc countries, countries subject to "arms" exports embargo under the United Nations Security Council's resolutions, or countries involved in or likely to be involved in international conflicts. See Yasuo Fukuda. "Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on the Approval of the National Defense Program Guideline, FY2005-." *Nihon Boueichou*, December 10, 2004. http://www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f_work/taikou05/e02_01.htm (accessed February 10, 2005).

⁵⁵ From: Michael D. Swaine, Rachel M. Swanger, and Takashi Kawakami, *Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense: The Case of Japan* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), 17.

Joint research and deployment with the United States will, however, also mean some level of integration of Japan's TMD system into the United States' controversial National Missile Defense (NMD) system. This has invoked much criticism over Japan's self imposed rejection of "collective self-defense."⁵⁶ Collective self-defense differs from individual self-defense in that:

...the term "individual right of self-defense" refers to the right of a country which is directly attacked (Japan) to repel such attack, and the term "right of collective self-defense" refers to the right of Japan, in a case where Japan does not itself undergo direct attack, to deem an attack against another country that is in an alliance with Japan (e.g. the United States) as an attack on itself and then counterattack.⁵⁷

Japan's motivations for creating the system under a *national security* framework has been extremely controversial in the region, yet Japan views such a system as purely defensive in nature, posing no threat to neighboring countries. The BMD system is actually intended to protect Japan from attack by only a small number of short-to medium-range ballistic missiles. Secretary Fukuda also addressed the issue of collective self-defense by claiming that the BMD system "will be operated based on Japan's independent judgment, and will not be used for the purpose of defending third countries"—a move clearly intended to appease Chinese fears of an integrated system with Taiwan.⁵⁸

6. Japan's Historical Issues

While every country in Asia has unique historical issues with Japan to overcome, such as resolution of acts committed by Japanese troops in World War II or in some cases disputes over islands claimed by both countries, two historical issues are common to all countries in Northeast Asia: visits by Japanese lawmakers to Yasukuni Jinja (lit. "peaceful-country shrine") and perceived attempts by the Japanese government to cover

⁵⁶ The issue of collective self-defense is not explicitly stated in Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, but is instead derived from a 1960 interpretation of Article 9. Riichi Furugaki. "Collective Self-Defense for Japan." In *Japan Watch, Pacific Forum CSIS*, May 2000. <http://www.csis.org/japan/japanwatch/jw000501.pdf> (accessed January 30, 2005).

⁵⁷ Katsuo Sorimachi. "Legal Basis for Japan's Ability to Exercise the Right of Collective Self-Defense." In *21st Century Shape of Japan Series, Tokyo Legal Mind, K.K.*, February 2001. http://www.lec-jp.com/speaks/info_001.html (accessed February 11, 2005).

⁵⁸ Fukuda. "Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on Japan's Preparedness to Respond to National Emergencies."

up its activities during World War II. These historical issues, while not directly pertinent to the JSDF, have had a great effect on Japan's defense policy. These issues have significant capability to affect the *stability* of the region and are seen as Japanese attempts to revive its *nationalist* tendencies.

On August 13, 2001, only four month after taking office, Prime Minister Koizumi set off a storm of controversy when he conducted a visit to the Yasukuni Jinja. Initially Koizumi had announced his intention to visit the shrine on August 15th to commemorate the end of World War II. This date was particularly offensive to China and Korea as, in their view, it marks their liberation from Japanese occupation. Although the shrine is often pointed to as a fabrication of Japan's imperial past, the history of Yasukuni Jinja actually began in June 1869, when the Emperor Meiji decreed that a shrine be built to honor the sacrifice of those that died during the Boshin Civil War. The shrine built in Tokyo's Kudanshita ward was originally named Tokyo Shokonsha (shrine for inviting the Spirits). In 1879, Tokyo Shokonsha was renamed Yasukuni Jinja. Inside are enshrined as *kami* (deities) all those who gave their lives in the service of Japan. Initially this included 3,500 *hashira*⁵⁹ (lit. pillar) from the Boshin Civil War, and the Saga and Satsuma Rebellions. Eventually 2,466,532 *hashira* were enshrined in Yasukuni Jinja, including 1,068 convicted war criminals from World War II, of which 14 were classified as Class A war criminals.⁶⁰ It is a Shinto belief that the sins of the living are removed following death, and therefore a visit to the shrine merely honors the sacrifice of nearly 2.5 million war dead, and does not constitute approval of the actions of a small percentage of those enshrined. Nonetheless, visits by Prime Minister Koizumi and other lawmakers have inflamed regional opinion of Japan as a sign of growing militarism. This is exacerbated by the control of Yasukuni Jinja by right-wing elements who refer to the convicted war criminals as "martyrs of Showa."

Similar to visits to Yasukuni Jinja is the controversy over the government's approval of publishing controversial history textbooks for use in Japanese middle schools. While the history of Japanese censorship of textbooks started prior to World

⁵⁹ When referring to the number of souls enshrined it is appropriate to refer to them as *hashira* vice *kami*.

⁶⁰ Yasukuni Jinja. "History of Yasukuni Jinja." February 1, 2005. <http://www.yasukuni.or.jp/english/> (accessed February 6, 2005).

War II, the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers (SCAP) instituted the modern practice in 1946 as an effort to “ensure that textbooks did not encourage emperor-worship and militarism.”⁶¹ The current system involves Japanese textbook publishers submitting draft copies to the Ministry of Education for approval, which then makes a short list of books available to local schools for selection and use. Review and recommendation of textbooks is an extremely opaque process, and until 1990 the feedback process from the Ministry to textbook publishers was exclusively oral. The current process of feedback is not much better, as it involves generic standardized language that requires “unofficial” clarification from Ministry officials.⁶²

Japanese censorship became an international issue in 1982 when the Ministry ordered historian Ienaga Saburo to change text in his book, which was deemed as too critical of Japanese history. International pressure resulted in the Ministry retracting its comments.⁶³ This controversy was revived in April 2001 when *The New History Textbook*, a book written by the rightist Japanese Institute for New History Education, was approved for use in junior high schools. This book, although eventually never used by any state or municipal public junior high school, met with strong protest in China, the Koreas, and Japan itself. It also caused the cancellation or postponement of many security exchanges. Additional concern was raised in January 2005 when the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) approved a draft reform to the basic law on education to include greater emphasis on *aikokushin* (love of country), a term many equate with pre-war militarism.⁶⁴

⁶¹ Kathleen Woods Masalski. “Examining the Japanese History Textbook Controversies.” In *Japan Digest*, Indiana University, November 2001. <http://www.indiana.edu/~japan/Digests/textbook.pdf> (accessed February 12, 2005).

⁶² Christopher Barnard, *Language, Ideology, and Japanese History Textbooks* (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 15.

⁶³ Masalski. “Examining the Japanese History Textbook Controversies.”

⁶⁴ *Economist.com*. “Playing with Fire: Japan's Ruling Party Wants to Inject Patriotism into Schools.” *From the Economist Print Edition*, January 20, 2005. http://www.economist.com/printedition/PrinterFriendly.cfm?Story_ID=3578090 (accessed February 19, 2005).

The concern expressed over the Japanese textbooks deals not only with what is written or omitted from the books, but also the way in which it is written. When examined linguistically, the patterns in the textbooks can be extrapolated into three categories:

The first process, termed ‘replacement’, refers to the use of certain lexical items, such as “shinshitsu” (‘advance’), instead of other similar items, like “shinryaku” (‘invade’), that contain very different nuances. The second process, ‘redefinition’, highlights the use of language that alters the very definition of an item or an event, for example redefining Japan’s role in World War II as participating in a war of liberation rather than a war of aggression. The third process, ‘deletion’ refers to the repression of lexical descriptors; one example is the non-usage of the term ‘jugun ianfu’ (“military sex slaves” or “comfort women”) in all of the textbooks.⁶⁵

Examination of these linguistic processes reveals a greater danger of the systematic development of an “ideology of irresponsibility and face-protection.”⁶⁶ This is further compounded by an educational system in Japan that stresses rote memorization over critical thinking. Students, and teachers, spend their time preparing for standardized college entrance exams known as *shiken jikoku* (examination hell), instead of debating the role Japan played in the “Pacific War.”⁶⁷ The combination of strict government control and a lack of critical thinking in schools has led students to implicitly trust the history textbooks as being the “full truth.”

The Japanese approval of controversial textbooks is seen in the region as only a small part of a concerted effort by Japan to absolve responsibility for past aggression. Both the Yasukuni Jinja controversy and the rewriting of history textbooks have increased concern in the region that the Government of Japan is leading a concerted effort to forget its past misdeeds and once again follow a militarist path. In addition, slow resolution of bilateral historical issues (e.g. territorial claims) have further increased distrust of Japan by its neighbors.

⁶⁵ Yumiko Ohara, “The Linguistic Construction of a National History and Its Ideological Consequences: The Treatment of World War II in Japanese History Textbooks” (paper presented at the 9th International Pragmatics Conference, October 27, 2004).

⁶⁶ Barnard, *Language, Ideology, and Japanese History Textbooks*, 153.

⁶⁷ When discussing Japanese wartime history, many Japanese revisionists focus entirely on Japan’s fight against the Western powers from 1941-1945, but omit the fact that the “Pacific War” started for Japan as early as the incident at Mukden in 1931.

III. NORTH KOREAN REACTIONS TO EXPANDING THE JSDF

Japan and North Korea have yet to normalize relations. Efforts to do this began in earnest in 1990 with the visit of former Deputy Prime Minister Kanemaru Shin to Pyongyang.⁶⁸ What followed was a series of unsuccessful talks in which the Japanese side wished to limit North Korea's jurisdiction for compensation purposes to the 38th parallel and asserted the validity of the 1910 treaty of annexation of Korea and the 1954 San Francisco peace treaty.⁶⁹ The North Koreans, for their part, demanded "compensations for Japan's colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula until 1945, war reparations and compensations, payment for the losses Japan caused North Korea by recognizing the South in 1965, and damages for what North Korea called Japan's complicity in the Korean War."⁷⁰ Even while normalization talks were ongoing, Japan was providing significant humanitarian aid to North Korea. The launch of a Taepo Dong ballistic missile over Japan on August 31, 1998 caused Japan to temporarily impose sanctions and suspended humanitarian assistance. Although Japan has often worked to resolve differences with North Korea, issues such as the ongoing nuclear crisis and the Japanese views of a half-hearted attempt by North Korea to address the issue of Japanese abducted by North Korean agents has brought normalization talks to a virtual standstill.

The recent passage of the NDPO and accompanying MTDP in December 2004 can be seen as a direct response to recent North Korean attempts at brinkmanship and the possibility of armed infiltrators conducting attacks in Japan in the event of a crisis. A recent *Asahi Shimbun* article explicitly raised the possibility of "armed agents from North Korea spilling into Japan during a military crisis on the Korean Peninsula."⁷¹ Such a scenario likely played a major factor in development of both the NDPO and plans for the future force structure of the JSDF.

⁶⁸ Hong, ed., *The Strategic Balance in Northeast Asia*, 2003, 150.

⁶⁹ Tsuneo Akaha, "Japan's Policy toward North Korea: Interests and Options," in *The Future of North Korea*, ed. Tsuneo Akaha (New York: Routledge, 2002), 83.

⁷⁰ Tsuneo Akaha, "Japanese Policy toward the North Korean Problem: Balancing Bilateralism and Multilateralism" (paper presented at the Northeast Asian Security: The North Korea Crisis, Clemson University, Greenville, South Carolina, April 2-3 2004), 7.

⁷¹ *Asahi Shimbun*. "Plan: SDF Alone will Fight N. Korea Agents." December 14, 2004. <http://www.asahi.com/english/politics/TKY200412140195.html> (accessed December 14, 2004).

A. NORTH KOREA AND JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONS

A major impetus for change in the mid-1990s in the role of the JSDF in maintaining stability in the region came from relations with North Korea, yet Japan's security relations have often also been dictated by the needs and desires of other nations, most importantly of the United States. The built-in mechanism for the coordination of security issues regarding North Korea originated from the Cold War framework in which the United States dictated the policy of containment against the Soviet-camp. With the end of the Cold War, the United States in many ways sustained a continuation of this framework. Japan, for its part since the 1991 Gulf War crisis, has more actively participated in maintaining "a stable and peaceful international environment favorable to its peace and prosperity," yet concurrently maintained the basic reliance on the United States.⁷² This dual hedge approach has led many to believe that "when in danger, Japan reverts to its alliance [with the United States] that has protected it for more than half a century."⁷³ While this may seem true when one compares Japan's strategy for engagement in North Korea to the United States, Japan has shown that it is willing to break out on its own when its interests are at stake.

A recent example of this was the visit by Prime Minister Koizumi to Pyongyang in September 2002 to discuss various security issues and the possibility of a resumption of normalization talks, a move not well received in Washington. The outcome of these talks was the 2002 "Pyongyang Declaration," which incorporated personal apologies both from Prime Minister Koizumi regarding Japan's historical treatment of Korea and from Kim Jong-Il on North Korea's abduction of Japanese citizens. In addition it resolved to work together to resolve compensation issues, to maintain peace and stability in the region and to quickly resume normalization talks. North Korea for its part also vowed to extend its moratorium on missile launches beyond 2003.⁷⁴ Although the declaration is technically still in effect, both sides have often pointed to the other as violating both the letter and the spirit of the declaration.

⁷² Akaha, "Japan's Policy toward North Korea: Interests and Options," 91-92.

⁷³ Gilbert Rozman, "Japan's North Korea Initiative and U.S.-Japanese Relations," *Orbis* 47, no. 3 (2003): 538.

⁷⁴ Akaha, "Japanese Policy toward the North Korean Problem: Balancing Bilateralism and Multilateralism", 10.

There are, however, some issues over which Japan maintains a policy strictly in line with the United States. Most important among these is the U.S. policy toward North Korea of “complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of all of its nuclear program.” Japan has endorsed its own version, comprised of four main points:

North Korea must freeze all nuclear programs including uranium enrichment programs;

North Korea must disclose information on all of its nuclear programs;

This freeze must entail efficient verification; and

Japan is ready to contribute to international energy assistance for North Korea only if these conditions are satisfied and if this freeze is a part of an agreement to dismantle North Korea's nuclear programs.⁷⁵

This policy, while a mirror of the U.S. policy, is also an outgrowth of Japan's stance during the 1994 nuclear crisis, when North Korean brinkmanship forced the United States to directly threaten the use of force to halt the reprocessing of nuclear fuel rods at the Yongbyon nuclear reactor. In Japan, the threat of a war on its doorstep was cause for concern, more out of the belief that Japan would be dragged into another “American war” than due to a true concern for the safety of Japan. Repeated calls to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire” began to increase recognition that Japan could be vulnerable to an attack from North Korea.⁷⁶ This false sense of security was shattered in August of 1998 with the North Korea Taepo Dong missile launch. The Japanese public realized that it was vulnerable to an attack from North Korea. Public paranoia of North Korea grew, with increased attention being given to numerous reports of North Korean spy ships, disguised as fishing boats operating off of Japan and rumors of drug deliveries, infiltration attempts by North Korean agents and even kidnappings of Japanese citizens. In March 1999, two North Korean “fishing boats” out-ran Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) ships in the Sea of Japan at speeds in excess of 35 knots—a speed not conducive to fishing—further fueling Japanese concerns of North Korea's intentions.

Japan's experiences with North Korea during the 1990s heavily influenced the drafting of the December 2000 Mid-Term Defense Program for FY 2001-2005. While

⁷⁵ Victor D. Cha. “Engagement from Strength.” In *Comparative Connections*, Pacific Forum CSIS, 2nd Quarter 2004. http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0402Qjapan_skorea.html (accessed November 28, 2004).

⁷⁶ Michael J. Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power*, 1st ed. (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 121.

stopping short of naming North Korea as a belligerent nation, it increased emphasis on protecting Japan from various forms of attacks such as guerilla-commando attacks, ballistic missile defense, evacuation of Japanese nationals overseas, intelligence, sustainability and survivability, all of which are thinly veiled references to North Korea.⁷⁷ The increased vigilance against North Korea paid off in December 2001 when the JCG intercepted another mothership south of Kyushu. The JCG vessel pursued the North Korean mothership and attempted to disable and board it. When the vessel opened fire on the JCG ship with small arms and probably with a rocket propelled grenade, the JCG sank it with no survivors, a move the North Korean government called “nothing but the brutal piracy and unpardonable terrorism of a modern band that could only be committed by samurais of Japan in defiance of international laws.”⁷⁸

Japanese–North Korean relations have not always been negative, and there are some issues that at times appeared to even be improving. Kim Jong-Il’s admission and apology during the September 2002 meeting with Prime Minister Koizumi regarding the abduction of Japanese citizens took Japan by surprise and indicated a possibility that relations between the countries could improve. This issue was, however, seized upon by the Japanese press, which turned it into continuing drama, complete with separated families, a United States Army deserter, and literally hundreds of unsolved disappearances being attributed to possible North Korean agents. Prior to North Korea’s admission, claims of abduction by North Korean agents were dismissed much as claims of “alien abductions” are in the United States. This revelation helped to create in Japan a “civic-societal ‘mood’ (if not movement) highly antagonistic toward North Korea.”⁷⁹

North Korea further fueled animosity on January 10, 2003 when it announced that it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, effective April 10, 2003. In addition, North Korea’s chief negotiator Kim Yong-Il revealed that North Korea had developed nuclear weapons, and declared “if the U.S. persists in its moves to apply

⁷⁷ *Nihon Boueichou* (Japan Defense Agency). “Defense of Japan 2001 (Summary).”

⁷⁸ James Brooke, “North Korea Calls Japan's Sinking of Mystery Boat 'Brutal Piracy',” *The New York Times*, December 27, 2001.

⁷⁹ Victor D. Cha. “It’s the Economy (and Culture), Stupid.” In *Comparative Connections, Pacific Forum CSIS*, 4th Quarter 2003. http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0304Qjapan_skorea.html (accessed November 28, 2004).

pressure and stifle the DPRK by force, the latter will have no option but to take a tougher counteraction.”⁸⁰ This revelation and hard-line approach by North Korea created calls to accelerate Japan’s military modernization efforts and created cover for the adopting of what might otherwise have been considered extremely controversial government legislation. Citing the North Korea threat, Japan continued with an expansion of its intelligence collection capabilities, moved to acquire more advanced PAC-3 Patriot missiles, and placed JMSDF ships on alert in the Sea of Japan.⁸¹ Director General of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Ishiba Shigeru even called for much more controversial systems such as the acquisition of Tomahawk cruise missiles, an offensive system that Japan has traditionally denounced, and a general build up in the JSDF.⁸²

While Prime Minister Koizumi has often advocated the need to further engage North Korea in resolving both the current nuclear crisis and other outstanding security concerns, he has also further pushed to strengthen his position vis-à-vis North Korea. This includes revision to the foreign exchange law passed on January 29, 2004 in the Lower House of the Diet that would enable Japan to unilaterally impose economic sanctions against North Korea.⁸³ Although North Korea was not explicitly named in the legislation, the understanding of its applicability to the current situation was once again clear.⁸⁴ North Korea was, however, explicitly named in the joint statement with the United States at the February 20, 2005 “2+2” meeting in Washington. The statement declared that North Korea’s nuclear ambitions “represents a direct threat to the peace and stability” in Asia, a move North Korea has denounced as a “vicious hostile policy”

⁸⁰ *Yonhap News Agency*. “North Korea This Week No. 213.” FBIS English Translation, October 24, 2002. <https://www.fbis.gov/> (accessed December 8 2004).

⁸¹ Thomas Berger, “Japan’s International Relations: The Political and Security Dimension,” in *The International Relations of Northeast Asia*, ed. Samuel S. Kim (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 151.

⁸² Shane Green. “Japan Strike Threat to Korea.” *Sydney Morning Herald*, February 15, 2003. <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/02/14/1044927803788.html> (accessed January 18, 2005), Nao Shimoyachi. “Japan Mulled Buying Cruise Missiles for Pre-emptive Self-Defense: Ishiba.” *The Japan Times*, January 25, 2005. <http://202.221.217.59/print/news/nn01-2005/nn20050125f2.htm> (accessed January 28, 2005).

⁸³ Previous legislation required a United Nations mandate to enact sanctions.

⁸⁴ Victor D. Cha. “Happy Birthday Mr. Kim.” In *Comparative Connections, Pacific Forum CSIS*, 1st Quarter 2004. http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0401Qjapan_skorea.html (accessed November 28, 2004).

leading to Japan's invasion of the Korean peninsula and the reestablishment of the "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere."⁸⁵ While such an invasion is unlikely, Japanese-North Korean relations remain problematic.

B. NORTH KOREAN DIPLOMATIC AND SECURITY OPTIONS

Due to North Korea's isolation from the international community and struggling economy, there are only a limited number of options that North Korea has to express its concerns about Japanese policies and actions. Because Japan and North Korea do not have formal relations, many of the traditional instruments of diplomacy are not available to North Korea. In addition, North Korean trade with Japan makes up only a very small amount of Japan's total trade (see Appendix C). North Korea is economically more reliant on Japan than Japan is on it.

Therefore, in order to influence Japanese decision-making, North Korea has only four means, none of which are very effective, to pressure the Japanese government. First among these are statements expressed by government officials and published through the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). North Korea's controlled press is extremely colorful and often very negative about Japan. Therefore, unlike statements made by South Korean or Chinese officials, negative North Korean statements are the norm and have little impact on Japanese decision-making. A second means is pressure placed on the government of Japan through the over 500,000 Korean nationals living in Japan. While pro-North Korean organizations such as Chosen Soren (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan) still boast memberships as high as 200,000, active participation has decreased yearly since the transfer of power in North Korea from Kim Il-Sung to his son, Kim Jung-Il. This organization, which absent an official embassy has traditionally represented North Korea's interests in Tokyo, is now less able to apply pressure on the Japanese government. A third option for North Korea is what has been referred to as "brinkmanship." North Korea's repeated efforts to develop nuclear weapons and test-launch ballistic missiles have been means by which North Korea has sought concessions or aid from Japan and the United States. The current Bush and Koizumi administrations' unwillingness to "reward North Korea for its bad behavior" has

⁸⁵ Elise Labott. "N. Korea: Japan, U.S. Plotting Invasion." *CNN.com*, February 20, 2005. <http://edition.cnn.com/2005/US/02/20/us.japan/index.html> (accessed February 20, 2005).

reduced the effectiveness of this negotiating tactic and has actually resulted in an anti-North Korea backlash in Japan. The final option for North Korea is the very process of reestablishing normal relations with Japan. Since the 1990s Japan has been eager to improve relations with North Korea, seeing the reestablishment of diplomatic relations as the first step in ensuring the peace and stability of the region. This issue has been repeatedly hijacked by rightist elements in Japan, making consistent pressure by North Korea difficult to sustain. North Korea's efforts to influence Japan's policy can be seen in more detail by examining the six case studies below.

C. COUNTER-TERRORISM OPERATIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

North Korean reaction to the JSDF deployment to the Indian Ocean was mostly muted, although the KCNA did label Japan's justification for supporting the Afghanistan operations as "brigandish sophistry that can be used only by the Japanese militarists who consider aggression and war for overseas expansion as means for their existence."⁸⁶ This toned-down response was not due to any level of acceptance by North Korea, but instead due to other issues of greater concern to North Korea that took precedence. At the same time that the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures law was being passed, Japanese relations with North Korea were being strained over an investigation of the May 1999 bankruptcy of the Chogin Tokyo Credit Union, which indicated that senior members of Chosen Soren had illegally funneled a large amount of the bank's funds to North Korea. This investigation led to an eventual police raid on the headquarters of Chosen Soren, a move North Korea "almost certainly interpreted as an affront to its sovereignty."⁸⁷

In addition, North Korea was becoming increasingly nervous that U.S. calls to end global terrorism would mean regime change in North Korea. These concerns were increased by Japan's apparent willingness to follow the United States in its endeavors, regardless of whether they break from Japan's post-war nonbelligerent past. These fears were further amplified in January 2002 when President George W. Bush labeled North Korea part of an "axis of evil." North Korea's attempts to return to the negotiating table

⁸⁶ *Korean Central News Agency*. "Japan's Moves for Overseas Aggression Under Fire." November 17, 2001. <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2001/200111/news11/17.htm#7> (accessed February 18, 2005).

⁸⁷ Victor D. Cha. "On Track and Off Course (Again)." In *Comparative Connections, Pacific Forum CSIS*, 4th Quarter 2001. http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0104Qjapan_skorea.html (accessed November 28, 2004).

so quickly after the dispatch of the JSDF overseas indicates that North Korean intentions are based more on short-term gains and immediate security concerns, than any long-term goals, such as the normalization of relations. Therefore, it is likely that changes in the JSDF's security missions or capabilities that do not directly affect North Korea are not likely to draw strong criticisms in the future. The fact that the deployments were outside of Northeast Asia likely helped to dampen North Korea's reaction.

D. IRAQI STABILITY OPERATIONS

Similar to the JSDF deployment to the Indian Ocean, the North Korean response to the Iraqi deployment was relatively benign. While Pyongyang remains concerned about an apparent resurgence of militarism in Japan, the ongoing issues surrounding the nuclear crisis and the return of Japanese abductees and their family members monopolized most of the discussions between Japan and North Korea in late 2003 and early 2004. In addition, the dispatch of more than 3,000 South Korean troops and Japan's strict adherence to humanitarian assistance and reconstruction (instead of counterinsurgency) operations undermined much of North Korea's argument of the deployment being another sign of Japan's growing militarism.

E. PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI)

Pyongyang views the PSI as a direct effort to isolate the North Korean regime and cut off a 'legitimate' source of income for the government. This is likely a true impression, as one of the major motivations for establishment of the PSI initiative was a lack of international legal precedence to seize a shipment of SCUD missiles en route Yemen from North Korea by the Spanish Navy in the Arabian Sea in December 2002.⁸⁸ Since the announcement of the PSI in May 2003, Pyongyang has warned all nations against violating the sovereignty of North Korean ships and aircraft.

The PSI principles were put to the test for the first time in the Pacific on August 13, 2003 when the North Korean cargo ship *Be Gae Hung* was detained in Kaoshiung, Taiwan and 158 barrels of the chemical weapons precursor, phosphorus pentasulfide, was

⁸⁸ Ralph A. Cossa et al. "Countering the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Role of the Proliferation Security Initiative." In *Issues and Insights, Vol. 4 - No. 5, Pacific Forum CSIS*, July 2004. http://www.csis.org/pacfor/issues/v04n05_pdf.pdf (accessed February 18, 2005).

seized following tips from U.S. intelligence officials.⁸⁹ The ship had stopped in Kaoshiung in order to offload various chemicals from Thailand, before returning to North Korea. Taiwanese officials indicated that the chemical was a controlled substance and the North Korea was obligated to declare it before entering port. Since the ship had not done so Taiwanese officials seized the shipment of chemicals. On August 21, 2003, approximately one week after the seizure of the *Be Gae Hung*, a North Korean Land and Maritime Transport Ministry spokesman condemned Taiwan's action, labeling it "a criminal act in wanton violation of international law ... and an intolerable infringement upon the sovereignty of the DPRK."⁹⁰ Unlike the December 2002 SCUD missile crisis, this issue quickly died in preparation for the commencement of the Six-Party Talks on August 27, 2003.

North Korean reaction to the PSI remained limited until the announcement in March 2004 that Japan would host a PSI exercise in the fall. North Korea once again warned against any violation of its sovereignty and warned of "powerful retaliation" if Japan interfered in North Korean affairs.⁹¹ Japan hosted the PSI exercise in October 2004 with the United States, Australia and France participating and observers from Thailand, the Philippines, Cambodia, New Zealand and fourteen other nations.⁹² The North Korean response was as expected, calling the participation in the exercise a clear violation of the 2002 Pyongyang Declaration.⁹³ While the October 2004 PSI exercise likely influenced Pyongyang's decision to withdraw from the six-party talks, it is more likely that the November 2004 U.S. presidential elections played more heavily into North Korea's decision to delay talks.

While North Korea has been relatively unhappy with Japanese participation in the PSI, the wide range of countries that have signed on, including most importantly Russia in May 2004, has caused North Korea to tone down its anti-Japanese rhetoric on this

⁸⁹ *Taipei Times*. "U.S. Lauds Taiwan for Confiscating Perilous Chemicals." August 14, 2003. <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2003/08/14/2003063677> (accessed December 28, 2004).

⁹⁰ Cossa et al. "Countering the Spread of WMD: The Role of the PSI."

⁹¹ Cossa et al. "Countering the Spread of WMD: The Role of the PSI."

⁹² *Economist.com*. "No Place to Hide, Maybe."

⁹³ David C. Kang. "Improving and Maturing, but Slowly." *Pacific Forum CSIS*, 4th Quarter 2004. http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0404Qjapan_skorea.html (accessed February 3, 2005).

scope. Most of North Korea's focus is instead aimed at the United States as the de facto leader and originator of the PSI. Japan, although a founding nation in the initiative, is relegated to a second-string role in PSI criticisms. By analyzing North Korea's reaction to Japanese involvement in PSI, it can be surmised that Japanese participation in operations that include a wide range of general support from the international community can help to deflect North Korean criticisms of Japanese military activities and exercises. Although the PSI is a global initiative, it does have specific regional security consequences when North Korea's proliferation history and the geographic extent of Japanese participation are considered. Therefore, it is likely that Japan can safely expand its regional security mission with only minor consequences from North Korea in cases that involve global or at a minimum extensive regional support.

F. TSUNAMI RELIEF

Japan's efforts to lead an East Asian response for tsunami relief have led to no response from the North Korean government. While not directly recognizing Japan's involvement in disaster relief operations and humanitarian assistance, North Korea did pledge \$150,000 in aid to victims of the tsunami only days after Japan's pledge of \$500 million. North Korea has traditionally welcomed Japanese efforts at providing humanitarian assistance, especially when it is the recipient. Using the tsunami relief mission as an example for future operations, it is unlikely that North Korea would actively oppose an extension of the JSDF's mission to better provide disaster relief or humanitarian assistance even if such a move increased Japan's military capability.

G. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Japan's decision to build a missile defense system in April 2003 came immediately on the heels of North Korea's official withdrawal from the NPT. Japan's announcement later that year brought veiled threats from North Korea, declaring it as part of a "preemptive war strategy."⁹⁴ But once again, North Korea's observable reaction were minimal, as relations had already stalled over a return to negotiations over the nuclear crisis and the Japanese demands at resolving the abduction issue. Speculation on a new round of No Dong MRBM tests and rhetoric aimed at Tokyo threatening to turn it into a "sea of fire" in September 2004 caused Japan to once again elevate the presence of

⁹⁴ Cha, "Happy Birthday Mr. Kim."

the AEGIS equipped JMSDF destroyers in the Sea of Japan. North Korea responded later that month that the deployment of missile defense ships in the Sea of Japan was an attempt by Japan to “isolate and crush” North Korea.⁹⁵

Due to the nature of the simultaneous crises occurring involving North Korea at the time of Tokyo’s announcement it is difficult to identify a direct North Korean response to Japan’s missile defense system, however North Korean “saber rattling” is a clear indicator of North Korea’s concerns over the deployment of such a system. North Korea sees the nuclear and missile issues as one of their few tools available to negotiate with the United States and Japan. This can be inferred from North Korea’s statement of withdrawal from the NPT, in which it rationalized that it was in “a dangerous situation where our nation's sovereignty and our state's security are being seriously violated...due to the U.S. vicious hostile policy towards the DPRK.”⁹⁶ By withdrawing from the treaty and removing the international legal obligations, North Korea was in a better position to “obtain meaningful security guarantees from Washington.”⁹⁷

Japan’s pledge to assist the United States in the research and development of a missile defense system, combined with Japan’s support for the United States’ “preemptive” (or preventive) war policy, has the potential to back North Korea into a corner without the full ability to use what has traditionally been an effective negotiating technique. This runs the risk of creating a downward spiral between North Korea and Japan in which each side reacts to the development and deployment of new systems by the other without a concerted effort to improve relations.

H. RESOLUTION OF HISTORICAL ISSUES

Japanese and North Korean attempts to address *kako no seisan* (settlement of the past) is the single case study presented in this chapter that Japan can deal bilaterally with North Korea. Yet this issue has emerged as one of the greatest barriers to a normalization of relations between the two countries and frequently emerges as an issue at multilateral

⁹⁵ Victor D. Cha. “Nuclear Sea of Fire.” In *Comparative Connections, Pacific Forum CSIS*, 3rd Quarter 2004. http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0403Qjapan_skorea.html (accessed November 28, 2004).

⁹⁶ Center for Nonproliferation Studies. “Text of North Korea's Statement on NPT Withdrawal.” January 10, 2003. <http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/nptstate.htm> (accessed September 8, 2004).

⁹⁷ Phillip C. Saunders and et al. “CNS Experts Respond to the DPRK's Withdrawal from the NPT.” *Center for Nonproliferation Studies*, January 14, 2003. <http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/nptstate.htm> (accessed September 8, 2004).

dialogues, such as the six-party talks.⁹⁸ What truly sets these issues apart with respects to North Korea, however, is that fact that historical issues run in both directions. While North Korea's press almost daily calls for Japan to properly address historical issues such as the Japanese use of Korean comfort women during World War II (an issue North Korea claims monetary compensation for), the Japanese press has often focused on the issue of Japanese nationals abducted by North Korean agents (an issue of national pride in Japan). While visits by Prime Minister Koizumi to Yasukuni Jinja have upset the North Korean government, it does not receive the level of near-daily press exposure in North Korea as the other historical issues since normalization talks broke down in late 2002. Perhaps not so coincidentally, visits to Yasukuni Jinja are not an issue for which North Korea claims monetary compensation.

Disagreements over historical issues will continue in the near term until Japan is convinced of North Korea's attempts to resolve the status of the remaining abductees, and an apology complete with an economic aid package is settled on that both North Korea and Japan agree upon. Needless to say, this will not likely occur in the near term. A major concern in both Washington and Tokyo regarding any financial assistance that Japan may provide as a form of compensation or reparations is that it would be large enough to "sustain the Kim Jong-Il regime without inducing any behavioral changes."⁹⁹ Therefore it is very likely that historical issues, not security relations, will continue to be the greatest obstacle to the normalization of relations and the development of a peaceful region.

I. SUMMARY

By looking at past changes in expansion of JSDF capabilities, a strong reactive correlation to actions by North Korea is observed, from calls to the development of a missile defense system following the 1998 launch of a Taepo Dong missile over Japan to the renewed emphasis on security brought about by fears posed by North Korean agents. Unfortunately, such moves continue to reveal Japan's use of a reactive defense policy with regards to North Korea. Although North Korea has not reacted directly to many

⁹⁸ Akaha, "Japan's Policy toward North Korea: Interests and Options," 77.

⁹⁹ Mark E. Manyin, "Japan-North Korea Relations: Selected Issues," in *CRS Report for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2003), 9.

changes by the JSDF, it is unclear whether Tokyo's consideration how to expand the mission or capabilities of the JSDF will further drive changes in Pyongyang's attitude toward Japan. These circumstances run the risk of creating a downward spiral of action-reaction. That being said, development and deployment of a functioning missile defense system and a strengthening of the JSDF's defensive capabilities could provide additional leverage for Tokyo when negotiating with North Korea, making Japan's decision a gamble with great potential rewards and consequences.

		Global	Regional	National
Security Oriented Activities	Case Study	Afghanistan	PSI	Missile Defense
	Reaction	Rhetoric	Sovereignty concerns	Attempt at isolation
Stability Oriented Activities	Case Study	Iraq	Tsunami Relief	Historical Issues
	Reaction	Rhetoric	None	Suspended talks

Table 1. North Korean Perceptions of Japanese Stability and Security Activities

While it is unlikely that relations between Japan and North Korea will (or for that fact can) significantly worsen, it is evident from the preceding case studies, summarized in the above table, that *national* actions by Japan are seen as threatening to North Korea. This being said, it is unlikely that there will be any major obstacles from North Korea to initiatives to expand the scope and capability of the Japan Self Defense Forces under *global* or *regional* frameworks. It is also evident from the case studies that North Korea is more open to changes that involve *stability* activities than to those that directly impact the JSDF's *security* missions. While North Korea's reaction was negative to both nationalist case studies, Japanese efforts at deploying a missile defense have met with increased North Korean "saber rattling," as opposed to a temporary suspension of talks.

As Japan further expands the mission and increases the capability of the JSDF, it must be prepared to deal with issues of how North Korea will perceive these moves. North Korea already perceives Japan as actively isolating it from not only the global economy, but also working with the United States to isolate North Korea from South

Korea. In the North Korean perspective, Japanese defense documents such as the recent NDPO that refers to the North Korean “threat” directly is intended to convince the United States to maintain its force presence in the region. This, in the perspective of Pyongyang, as well as some in South Korea, ensures that the Korean peninsula remains weak, divided and no threat to Japanese “imperialistic” motivations. While it is unlikely that Japan can convince North Korea otherwise in the foreseeable future, these perceptions can be minimized by continuation of an open security dialogue (e.g. the six-party talks) and efforts to legitimize any expansion in a regional or global framework. Japan must also be prepared to expand this perception management to issues that North Korea sees as efforts to revive Japanese militarism.

IV. CHINESE REACTIONS TO EXPANDING THE JSDF

The future of relations between the People's Republic of China and Japan continues to be one of the major focal points of discussion in East Asia. Chinese leaders have been cautious of a remilitarized Japan since its defeat in World War II. So concerned was Beijing that in 1950 it concluded the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union in order to check the "repetition of aggression on the part of Japan or any other state which should unite in any form with Japan in acts of aggression."¹⁰⁰ Japan-China relations did, however, improve quickly following normalization of relations in 1972 as Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) and investment began to pour into China.

The relationship between China and Japan has grown more complex with the end of the Cold War as Japan struggles to identify its place in the "new world order." Although Japan's *kinken gaiko* was criticized in the United States and Europe, from a Chinese perspective, Japanese response to the Gulf War was considered fair and appropriate. With Japan's efforts toward a more active role in regional and global security affairs since the Gulf War, China has become extremely concerned about a concerted effort on the part of the United States to rearm Japan as part of an "evil alliance" to contain China.¹⁰¹ Japanese leaders are, for their part, concerned about the rapidly growing economic and military capabilities of China. The rapid expansion is seen by some as the first move by China to assert hegemonic control over Asia. While Japan and China have tried to remain engaged in security matters, internal issues such as the Tiananmen protests in 1989 and Japanese treatment of historical issues have often caused relations to be temporarily damaged. Even though China remains critical of a perceived aggressive foreign policy in Japan, it balances this by actively engaging both Japan and the United States in an attempt to ease tensions in Asia.

¹⁰⁰ "Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance Between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China." February 14, 1950.

¹⁰¹ Denny Roy, *China's Foreign Relations*, 1st ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 163.

A. JAPAN AND CHINA SECURITY RELATIONS

Tokyo's relationship with Beijing after World War II quickly became a victim of the U.S. Taiwan policy. Although the government of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru wished to recognize Beijing, the United States placed extreme pressure on Japan to recognize Taipei at the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. The Japanese public though was more inclined to normalize relations with Beijing, 57 percent supported normalizing relations in 1952, and this increased to 75 percent in 1960.¹⁰² Even without formalized relations Japan and China did manage to maintain a small trade relationship.

By the 1970's growing Soviet power and force build-ups along the Chinese border became the greatest concern to Beijing. From 1969 to 1973 Moscow increased its Army divisions deployed along the Chinese border from twenty-five to forty-five. The 1972 rapprochement with the United States provided an opportunity for China to contain the growing Soviet power and establish a new balance of power in Asia. It also allowed the quick recognition of Beijing by Japan and the resumption of trade relations, which surpassed trade with Taiwan by 1975 (see Appendix C). In addition, access to foreign investment and technology helped to stimulate a stagnant Chinese economy. Japan also benefited from this relationship as Beijing supported Tokyo in the territorial dispute over the Kurile Islands and actually supported the strengthening of the U.S.–Japan security alliance.

Japan–China relations improved steadily until the incident at Tiananmen Square in 1989. The international condemnation of China forced Japan to suspend economic ties and created an increasingly negative view of China in Japan (See Figure 2 on page 55). Japan was, however, the first nation to restore ties with China following the crisis, a move that brought criticism on Japan by Western nations.¹⁰³ Although the trust between the two nations had been damaged by the Tiananmen incident, work began quickly to restore economic exchanges, including the reestablishment of ODA from Japan to China. Japanese ODA continued until China conducted a series of underground nuclear tests at the Lop Nor test site in western China in May 1995. These tests came only days after

¹⁰² Berger, "Japan's International Relations: The Political and Security Dimension," 153.

¹⁰³ Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power*, 78.

China had pledged its support to the NPT in New York and less than two weeks after the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Murayama, who had called for a halt to worldwide nuclear testing.¹⁰⁴ Japan's cancellation of ODA resulted in strong calls by China for Japan to resolve its history issues, equating the ODA loans to official reparations, even when no official connection existed. Japanese opinion of China continued to worsen as China conducted a large-scale missile exercise opposite Taiwan in 1996 and renewed calls to investigate the "China threat" drove a wedge in relations.

Japan's greater role in international affairs changed slightly with the publishing of the 1997 "Revised Guidelines for Defense Cooperation" that detailed the types of assistance that Japan would provide in the event of a regional contingency, including rear area support, intelligence sharing, and bilateral planning.¹⁰⁵ This was dismissed in China as a new step in "Tokyo's quest for mastery over Asia."¹⁰⁶ Such comments such as there were reminiscent of Beijing's criticisms in the late 1980s when Japanese defense spending broke the traditional 1 percent of GNP limit. At the time it was feared that Japanese spending would soon get out of control — "it is unavoidable," Beijing stated "the second and third 'breaks' will follow, and that the state of affairs will get out of control."¹⁰⁷ Such second and third breaks did not occur and Japanese defense spending soon returned to the 1 percent limit, but suspicions of Japanese motives have remained in place. Of particular concern in the revised guidelines was the new concept introduced in the agreement that detailed cooperation in "Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan" (SIASJ). Although initially outlined in the 1997 Defense cooperation guidelines, the Japanese Diet incorporated it on August 29, 1999 in "the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan."¹⁰⁸ The establishment of SIASJ procedures was intended to clarify Japan's role in regional security operations and contingencies, such as through direct support to the United States

¹⁰⁴ Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power*, 80-82.

¹⁰⁵ *Nihon Boueichou* (Japan Defense Agency), "Defense of Japan 1991," 279-286.

¹⁰⁶ Roy, *China's Foreign Relations*, 163.

¹⁰⁷ Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), 89.

¹⁰⁸ In Japanese: 周辺事態に際して我が国の平和及び安全を確保するための措置に関する法律

during a Korean peninsula conflict.¹⁰⁹ This allowed Japan to start looking further into geographic areas away from the immediate vicinity of Japan that could have an important influence on Japan's peace and security. Specifically China was concerned that this new sphere of influence included Taiwan, a move seen in Beijing as an “attempt to extend its military feelers into Chinese territory.”¹¹⁰ At the same time Japan and China were also moving ahead in efforts to broaden security coordination. Between 1997 and 1999 Beijing and Tokyo concluded agreements on maritime accident prevention, joint drills and reciprocal port visits.¹¹¹ These exchanges were, however, overshadowed by continued historical distrust.

The December 2000 MTDP built on many of the pre-existing initiatives from the 1995 NDPO, but it increased emphasis on protecting Japan from various forms of attacks such as guerilla-commando attacks, ballistic missile defense, evacuation of Japanese nationals overseas, intelligence, sustainability and survivability.¹¹² Although the MTDP was, however, careful to not name any particular countries of concern and kept the source of threats thinly veiled, it did not keep Chinese criticism of Japan from reaching a peak by mid-2001. The main focus of which dealt not so much with Japanese military policy, but instead with visits by Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro to the Yasukuni Jinja, revisions of Japanese textbooks and perceived discrimination by Japanese governments against Chinese consumers.¹¹³

Following the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, Japan became more active in regional and global affairs. While China supported the U.S. war on terrorism, efforts by the Koizumi administration to expand the mission of the JSDF have been met with suspicion and criticism. The growing relationship between Japan and

¹⁰⁹ *Nihon Boueichou* (Japan Defense Agency), “Defense of Japan 1991,” 279-286.

¹¹⁰ Pei Yuanying, “Military Power Ambition,” *Beijing Review*, July 29, 2004, 15. In my personal experience with the JDA from 2001-2003, officers at the Joint Staff Office (JSO) would only discuss SIAJS procedures when dealing with threats from either terrorism or North Korea and would not even consider discussing Taiwan.

¹¹¹ Chung-in Moon and Taehwan Kim, “South Korea's International Relations: Challenges to Developmetal Realism,” in *The International Relations of Northeast Asia*, ed. Samuel S. Kim (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 76.

¹¹² *Nihon Boueichou* (Japan Defense Agency). “Defense of Japan 2001 (Summary).”

¹¹³ Gilbert Rozman, “China's Changing Images of Japan, 1989-2001: The Struggle to Balance Partnership and Rivalry,” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 2, no. 1 (2002): 121.

the United States as evident in Japan's active involvement in the global war on terrorism raised fears in Beijing of a more active alliance between Washington and Tokyo. This concern has been reinforced by Japanese government publications such as the 2003 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Bluebook, which listed the primary goals of Japan as to "firmly maintain the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, moderately build up Japan's defense capability on an appropriate scale and pursue diplomatic efforts to ensure international peace and security."¹¹⁴ In comparison the 1994 Diplomatic Bluebook listed the main goals of Japan as to "strengthen the functions of the United Nations and increase trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States and Europe."¹¹⁵

The publishing of the 2004 NDPO has been seen with great concern by Beijing, as, according to an English translation by Xinhua news agency, the report states that "it is necessary to watch China's nuclear and ballistic missile programs, the modernization of its navy and air force and its attempts to expand marine activities." The NDPO falls short of indicating a direct threat from China as it does from North Korea, but instead highlights Japan's "concerns" about China's military intent. Japan Defense Agency Director General Ono Yoshinori further emphasized this during the press conference unveiling the NDPO and accompanying MTDP in which he highlighted "the recent case in which a Chinese submarine intruded into Japanese waters."¹¹⁶ The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue denounced Japan's inclusion of China in the report as "totally groundless and extremely irresponsible."¹¹⁷

Although relationships have been strained since early 1989, coordination and consultation occurs for a wide range of issues. Japan and China continue to engage in regional security mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the six-party talks, and the trilateral Foreign Ministers meetings between Japan, China, and South

¹¹⁴ *Nihon Gaimushou* (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs). "2003 Diplomatic Bluebook." *Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, 2003. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/index.html> (accessed December 16, 2004).

¹¹⁵ *Nihon Gaimushou* (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs). "1994 Diplomatic Bluebook." 1994. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/index.html> (accessed December 16, 2004).

¹¹⁶ *People's Daily Online*. "Japan's New Defense Outline to be Effective from April 2005."

¹¹⁷ *Xinhuanet*. "Japan's Description of 'China Threat' 'Extremely Irrisponsible' (sic)." December 11, 2004. http://news3.xinhuanet.com:80/english/2004-12/11/content_2323033.htm (accessed December 12, 2004).

Korea that most recently took place in Vientiane, Laos on November 27, 2004.¹¹⁸ In addition, the China–Japan economic relationship has grown extensively in the last ten years, with China surpassing the United States as Japan’s leading trade partner in 2004 (See Appendix C). Even with these multilateral contacts and strengthened economic relations, unless issues of cultural distrust can be worked out, it is unlikely that any bilateral security coordination will emerge. This could, similar to North Korea, lead to a continuing downward spiral as Japan expands its JSDF to ensure its own security and China counters with a greater emphasis for its own military on offsetting Japan. With China’s growing economic power and resource base, neither is an option that the United States nor Japan wishes to see.

B. CHINESE DIPLOMATIC AND SECURITY OPTIONS

Unlike North Korea, China has a full range of diplomatic options available to use in order to try and influence Japanese security policy decision-making. The strongest option for Beijing to express its displeasure with Tokyo has been cancellation of visits by senior officials. While this effectively expresses China’s displeasure over Japanese policies and actions, it also has the side effect of reducing cooperation and coordination between the nations. As Japan–China economic relations become increasingly interrelated, it will be extremely important for a mutual trust to emerge between the two nations. China also is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Although reluctant to use its veto power, China has expressed its concern over Japanese support to U.S. policies in the UN and continues to block efforts by Tokyo to obtain a permanent seat on the UNSC. In addition to formal diplomatic options, China has a large military capable of operating outside of territorial waters. Deployments of submarines off Okinawa and research vessels around the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands have shown Beijing’s willingness to use low-level military approaches to reinforce its position. China is, however, careful not to let military options become too strong, less it reinforces the regional perception of a “China threat.”

¹¹⁸ While dealing mostly with legal consultation, security issues such as the current North Korean nuclear crisis and United Nations reform were also discussed. For a summary of the meeting see: Nihon Gaimushou (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs). “The Trilateral Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Japan, the People’s Republic of China, and the Republic of Korea.” November 27, 2004. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/conference/asean3/summary0411.html> (accessed December 5, 2004).

In addition, much like North Korea, China's media are effectively controlled by the state, though their content is much less colorful in content. Beijing uses the press to not only inform its public, but also provide subtle (and often not so subtle) indications of Chinese opinion on a wide range of security issues. Unlike North Korea, a strong pro-Taiwan lobby has usurped Chinese unofficial representation in Tokyo, making back-channel approaches to Japanese lawmakers less influential.

C. COUNTER-TERRORISM OPERATIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

Following the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 Japan was quick to pledge the assistance of the JMSDF and JASDF in the war on terrorism. By November, ships were deployed to the Indian Ocean to assist in logistics for the United States, and later coalition forces, conducting operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Although China was actively cooperating with the United States on anti-terrorism measures in order to justify the execution of its own anti-terrorism operations in western China, the strong support shown by Tokyo for Washington was a major concern. To head off criticism Prime Minister Koizumi met with Chinese leaders to obtain "understanding" regarding Japan's support to the United States.¹¹⁹ Japan also expressed its readiness to undertake any expansion of the role of the JSDF. Although the Chinese press often raised Japan's historical issues as a concern, Beijing did provide an interesting concession. In a meeting between China's Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Japan's Deputy Foreign Minister Takano Toshiyuki on November 21, 2001, the Chinese side expressed support, stating "if the United Nations plays the leading role and under this framework, the countries concerned, including Japan, extend cooperation based on their own circumstances, we will welcome it."¹²⁰

Chinese criticisms increased in December 2002, when Japan dispatched the *JMS Kirishima*, an AEGIS class destroyer to the Indian Ocean. This move was seen by China as an escalation of the mission that had been agreed upon the previous year. Blame was primarily placed on pressure from the United States rather than on Japan itself, with one source opining that "Japan's continual escalation of its foreign intervention is the

¹¹⁹ James J Pryzstup. "From Precipice to Promise." In *Comparative Connections, Pacific Forum CSIS*, 4th Quarter 2001. http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0104Qjapan_china.html (accessed February 28, 2005).

¹²⁰ Pryzstup. "From Precipice to Promise."

consequence of the continuing escalation of U.S. pressure on Japan.”¹²¹ While the initial deployment was carefully coordinated and seen as primarily a logistics effort, the deployment of one of Japan’s modern AEGIS equipped ships was seen as an aggressive move in support of the growing U.S. conflict with Iraq. Relations between the two nations had deteriorated since the initial coordination meetings due to, among other things, visits to Yasukuni Jinja by Prime Minister Koizumi and a May 2002 incident at the Japanese consulate in Shenyang where Chinese police entered the grounds to remove North Korean asylum seekers. This prevented the same level of coordination that had occurred for the first deployment, and increased Chinese suspicions of Japan’s intentions.

D. IRAQI STABILITY OPERATIONS

Beijing has become increasingly adamant about greater Japanese military involvement in overseas military operations, whether for security or stability purposes. Initially one of only a handful of nations that opposed Japan’s deployment of peacekeeping troops to Cambodia in 1993, China has become increasingly concerned with the ever-expanding role of the JSDF. Chinese leaders have become even more concerned with the deployment of JGSDF soldiers to Iraq in support of the U.S.-led coalition outside of a United Nations peacekeeping framework. Such a deployment in direct support of the United States has been especially worrisome, as it indicates Japan’s willingness to follow the United States on issues not supported in the United Nations and questionable under the current constitutional framework. This has raised concern that Japan would more actively support the United States in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait or that Japan could also begin to challenge China’s security interests outside of the region.

It also is seen in Beijing as a sure sign of Tokyo’s desire to return to its former position as a global military power. Japan’s involvement in overseas areas is seen in China as part of a large strategy by Japan to remove the pacifist constraints in its post-war constitution. In Beijing, legislation passed to allow the deployment was seen as merely serving to “drape an ‘overcoat’ of ‘legitimacy’ over Japan’s strategy for turning itself into

¹²¹ Li Xiang, “Aegis Warship Rushes Overseas as the More the Japan Self-Defense Force Moves, the Farther it Goes.” FBIS English Translation, *Beijing Renmin Wang*, December 19, 2002. <https://www.fbis.gov/> (accessed December 10, 2004).

a major military power.”¹²² Future deployments in support of active security missions will be studied carefully in Beijing. Any increase in mission scope or size, or more importantly, active participation by the JSDF in hostilities, will be met with sharp criticism in Beijing. Active engagement with China in preparation for these missions can decrease regional tension, but it is unlikely that China would actively support overseas deployments of the JSDF in the near term.

E. PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI)

Chinese views on the PSI in general are mixed. China was one of seven APEC nations that signed an agreement in Tokyo on October 27, 2003 agreeing to limit the export of WMD technologies, yet it has remained reluctant to endorse the PSI.¹²³ While supporting overall initiatives to stem the proliferation of WMD, there are concerns in Beijing over the legality of certain aspects of the law. Specific among these concerns is that the seizure of ships on the high seas would violate the right of free passage afforded by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. China has stated that while it supports the overall non-proliferation initiative, the problem of “proliferation shall be resolved through political and diplomatic means within the framework of international laws.”¹²⁴ Beijing prefers to address the root causes of proliferation, such as unstable security environments, rather risking active seizure of materiel that could lead to a regional conflict.

While support from China has been limited, Japan has played a critical role in garnering regional support, first by hosting the APEC proliferation meeting in October 2003, followed by the Asian Senior level Talks on Proliferation (ASTOP) in November, and by addressing the issue at the ASEAN–Japan regional summit in Tokyo in December that year. Japan has also actively pursued Chinese participation in the PSI. Beijing’s reluctance to participate has less to do with Japan’s active involvement in regional security frameworks than with concerns of upsetting North Korea and the six-party

¹²² Chen Mingtian and Hou Zhenjie. “What Breakthroughs has Japan’s White Paper on Defense Effected.” *Beijing Liaowang*, August 11, 2003. <https://www.fbis.gov/> (accessed December 11, 2004).

¹²³ Cossa et al. “Countering the Spread of WMD: The Role of the PSI.”

¹²⁴ Qiyue Zhang. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s Press Conference.” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China*, February 12, 2004. <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/2510/2511/t65977.htm> (accessed February 23, 2005).

talks.¹²⁵ China fears that participation in the PSI would inhibit its capability to apply the little remaining political pressure that Beijing has over Pyongyang. As long as the current crisis over North Korea's nuclear program continues, it is unlikely that China will actively support this initiative. China will also not criticize Japan's involvement as long as Japan stays clear of controversial situations, such as participation in a high seas boarding.

F. TSUNAMI RELIEF

Much like Japan, China was quick to offer support to countries hit by the December 2004 earthquake and tsunami. Following the disaster, China was quick to try and appear as a "big country" and show the "friendliness of the Chinese government and people."¹²⁶ China approved a \$2.6 million aid package on December 28, only two days after the event. Although the initial amount was low compared to what other industrialized nations pledged, China claimed it was appropriate due China's position as a "developing" country with a low *per capita* GDP. This argument was, interestingly enough, maintained when the amount was raised to \$60.2 million on December 31, 2004 with an additional \$20 million added on January 6, 2005.¹²⁷

Historically, China is cautious when dealing with Southeast Asia due to its own failed attempts to support communist revolutions in the 1960s, but increasing dependence on foreign raw materials and integration into the regional economy have caused China to look more to the South. China is also concerned by what it perceives as efforts by the United States and Japan to co-opt ASEAN support in regional issues, such as territorial disputes and trade differences. China moved quickly to provide aid in order to head off criticism that only the United States and Japan were in positions to provide military support to disaster relief operations by the public announcement of the use of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in providing support to disaster relief.¹²⁸ That support,

¹²⁵ *Economist.com*. "No Place to Hide, Maybe."

¹²⁶ People's Daily Online. "China's Additional 500 Million Yuan Humanitarian Aid to Tsunami Victims Shows Image of a Big Country." January 5, 2005. http://english.people.com.cn/200501/05/eng20050105_169687.html (accessed February 27, 2005).

¹²⁷ D. S. Rajan. "China: Tsunami Relief Contribution and Objectives." Vol. III Issue 2, *Observer Research Foundation*, January 10, 2005. <http://www.observerindia.com/strategic/st050110.htm> (accessed February 27, 2005).

¹²⁸ People's Daily Online. "PLA Active in Tsunami Relief Work." January 5, 2005. http://english.people.com.cn/200501/05/eng20050105_169694.html (accessed February 27, 2005).

however, was limited to logistics within China in order to consolidate supplies at airports for delivery in the region by civilian aircraft. Deployments to the region were limited to an engineering unit from Beijing to assist in recovery operations and a People's Armed Police mobile hospital deployed to Indonesia.¹²⁹

The PLA has not traditionally played a large role in either peacekeeping or humanitarian operations, as seen by the slow response to use the PLA during the 1998 floods.¹³⁰ Instead China has supported United Nations leadership in these areas. Although Beijing was likely concerned that a PLA military presence in Southeast Asia would increase the perception of a "China threat," the deployment of the JMSDF and JGSDF in a coordinated operation under a JTF structure will undoubtedly be studied in Beijing. While official response to the Japanese deployment has been minimal, the possibility exists that the decision not to act could be interpreted in Tokyo as a Chinese *inability* to act.¹³¹

While Japan has carefully managed the deployment so as not to inflame criticism in the region, the apparent ready acceptance of Japanese troops and efforts at regional leadership, compared with the lukewarm response to China's presence, could increase China's perception of an attempt at regional isolation. China will not likely protest future humanitarian operations in the region by the JSDF, but the reaction could become critical if China sees Japan as trying to marginalize Chinese relations in the region.

G. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Chinese concerns over the Japanese ballistic missile defense programs began in 1995 when discussions of a joint U.S.–Japan TMD systems were initiated. Beijing consistently argued that the development of any such system could "undermine China's nuclear deterrent and might be extended to the defense of Taiwan."¹³² Chinese leverage on this situation was, however, nullified by North Korea's launch of a Taepo Dong

¹²⁹ Drew Thompson. "Tsunami Relief Reflects China's Regional Aspirations." Vol. 5, Issue 2, *The Jamestown Foundation*, January 18, 2005. http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=408&issue_id=3201&article_id=2369109 (accessed February 27, 2005).

¹³⁰ Thompson. "Tsunami Relief Reflects China's Regional Aspirations."

¹³¹ Thompson. "Tsunami Relief Reflects China's Regional Aspirations."

¹³² Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power*, 92.

missile in August 1998. By October 1998, Tokyo and Washington announced their intent to jointly develop a system, only a month before Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Tokyo. The visit occurred as planned, with no mention of the Japanese decision to participate in the NTWD system.

The December 2004 NPDO placed renewed emphasis on the joint research, development and deployment of a missile defense with the United States.¹³³ With this renewed emphasis has come renewed criticism from China, which points to the development as further proof of Japan's "long-term strategic objective to become a big political and military power..."¹³⁴ Currently, the system that Japan plans to develop is designed strictly to protect Japan from attack by a small number of short- to medium-range ballistic missiles, not as part of the broader U.S. NMD system. While the system will include only low altitude interceptors, similar to those already deployed on the AEGIS destroyers, Beijing is concerned that once in place the Japanese system could be expanded to include higher altitude interception capabilities intended to stop Chinese inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM) aimed at the United States. As a result, Chinese response is curiously mixed. While Beijing understands the rationale for Tokyo to develop a system to protect itself from North Korean missile attacks, it is very concerned that recent anti-China rhetoric in Japan could indicate intent to deploy the system against China. Future response from Beijing to the development and deployment of the system will likely be cautious, but the issue is unlikely to upset long-term relations as long as the system will not be used against China. Deployment of a ground based missile defense system to Southern Kyushu or more importantly Okinawa or deployment of JMSDF AEGIS destroyers on missile defense missions outside of the Sea of Japan will likely be met with an immediate negative response from Beijing. Such moves, even if seen as defensive in Tokyo will most certainly be seen as escalatory by Beijing.

H. RESOLUTION OF HISTORICAL ISSUES

The legacy of Japanese forces in China during the Pacific War has often been a point of major contention between Beijing and Tokyo. Chinese claims of Japanese

¹³³ *Nihon Boueichou* (Japan Defense Agency), "*Bouei Keikaku no Taiko* (National Defense Program Outline)."

¹³⁴ Luo Yuan and Wang Guifang, "Japan's Shield, Scourge of Others?," *Beijing Review*, January 15, 2004, 45.

intransigence over issues such as the issuance of a formal apology and the continued visits to Yasukuni Jinja by the Prime Minister have hindered relations. The Japanese occupation was also brought to the forefront in Chinese views in 2003 when a Japanese artillery shell left over from World War II, filled with mustard gas, exploded, resulting in one death and forty-three injured.¹³⁵ Although Japan paid almost \$2.8 million in damages, the wound was much deeper to Chinese public opinion. Japan, on the other hand, sees China as unwilling to truly accept any apology and that China continues to exploit the past for immediate gains. In truth, both views are likely correct.

Official Chinese response to the approval of the 2001 New History Textbook was extremely negative. Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Banzao warned Japan that China “would not accept the interpretation of wartime events put forth by the new textbook.”¹³⁶ Specifically, Beijing was concerned that the book excluded any mention of “germ warfare experiments carried out on Chinese citizens by the notorious Unit 731 of the Japanese army” and even cast “doubt on the extent and veracity of the Rape of Nanking...”¹³⁷ Simultaneously, there were internal and external pressures being placed on Prime Minister Koizumi regarding his planned visit to Yasukuni Jinja in August 2001. The visit was strongly denounced in China and has emerged as “the primary impediment to improving bilateral relations.”¹³⁸

Although public relations were strained at the highest levels, working level meetings continued, only to be further damaged by continued visits to Yasukuni Jinja. In early 2002, preparations were being made for the visit of the Director General of the Japan Defense Agency, Nakatani Gen to China. This visit was intended in preparation of the first reciprocal visits by JMSDF ships to China and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships to Japan. These visits were quickly cancelled in April 2002 when Prime Minister Koizumi and nearly 190 Japanese lawmakers or their proxies visited

¹³⁵ Charles E. Morrison, ed., *Asia Pacific Security Outlook 2004* (Tokyo, Japan: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2004), 111.

¹³⁶ Masalski. “Examining the Japanese History Textbook Controversies.”

¹³⁷ Barnard, *Language, Ideology, and Japanese History Textbooks*, 17.

¹³⁸ Brad Glosserman. “Troubling Signs for Japan-China Relations.” In *PacNet Newsletter, Pacific Forum CSIS*, September 2, 2004. <http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0437.pdf> (accessed January 22, 2005).

Yasukuni Jinja.¹³⁹ Although a visit by Director General Ishiba Shigeru with his Chinese counterpart Cao Gangchuan in Shanghai did occur in September 2003, plans to conduct reciprocal port visits in November 2003 were postponed due to concerns over upsetting the ongoing six-party talks.¹⁴⁰ The Yasukuni Jinja issue has become such a concern for China that it is unwilling to accept any negotiations on the subject; Japan must stop official visits to the shrine for relations to improve. China views the visits to the shrine as such an affront to its history that it is willing to sacrifice improved relations with Japan until Tokyo relents.

The view in Japan is quite different. Tokyo, for its part, has expressed a willingness to apologize to China for historical issues, but only if such issues can be put behind them once and for all. In the view of Japanese, Japan has repeatedly accepted responsibility for the occupation of foreign nations. These steps include the speech made by Emperor Akihito during his visit to China in 1992, when he recalled “there was a period in the past when my country inflicted untold hardship on the people of China. This remains the source of my profound personal sorrow.”¹⁴¹ A similar expression of regret was repeated on May 3, 1995 with the visit of Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi to the Marco Polo Bridge, where he “prayed for Japan–China friendship and eternal peace.”¹⁴² Although these speeches were well received in China, relations between Japan and China were severely damaged two weeks later, on May 15, when China conducted a nuclear test at Lop Nor. In protest of the tests Japan froze economic aid and China once again began to play the “history card.”

Japan–China relations had a chance to improve with the visit of Chinese President Jiang Zemin to Tokyo in November 1998. In preparation for the visit, Japan announced that they were willing to offer a full apology, including the use of the terms *hansei* (deep remorse) and *owabi* (heartfelt apology), if China were willing to accept this as the “final

¹³⁹ James J. Pryztup. “Bridges to the Future, Reflections on the Past.” In *Comparative Connections, Pacific Forum CSIS*, 3rd Quarter 2003. http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0303Qjapan_china.html (accessed December 11, 2004).

¹⁴⁰ *Tokyo Jiji*. “China Reportedly Shelves Naval Visit to Japan to Avoid Provoking North Korea.” FBIS English Translation, October 30, 2003. <https://www.fbis.gov/> (accessed December 11, 2004).

¹⁴¹ Mataka Kamiya, “Japanese Foreign Policy Toward Northeast Asia,” in *Japanese Foreign Policy Today*, ed. Inoguchi Takashi and Purnendra Jain (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 235.

¹⁴² Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power*, 95.

word” on the issue. This offer was flatly rejected by Beijing. The situation became even more uncomfortable for Tokyo during an official state dinner for President Jiang at the Imperial Palace hosted by Emperor Akihito. During the formal toast, President Jiang, dressed in a Mao jacket, criticized Japan’s unwillingness to address the history problem during the formal toast.¹⁴³ Both the Japanese press and politicians were extremely angered by this display.




Figure 2. Japanese Public Opinion of China¹⁴⁴

Continued calls by China for Japan to resolve its “history issues” are creating a strong backlash in Japan, and more attention is being focused on the way China is teaching its own modern history (See Figure 2). For example, Japanese scholars are quick to point out that Chinese students are unaware of the positive role that Japanese economic assistance has played in helping China to build its economy, nor are they taught about the consequences of China’s own disastrous policies during the Great Leap

¹⁴³ Green, *Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power*.

¹⁴⁴ After: *Nihon Naikakufu Daijin Kanbou Seifu Kouhoushitsu* (Japan Cabinet Office Secretariat Public Relations Department). “*Gaikou ni Kan Suru Yoron Chousa* (The Public Opinion Poll Regarding Diplomacy).” October 2004. <http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h16/h16-gaikou/2-1.html> (accessed February 27, 2005).

Forward. This has led to an increasingly negative view of Japanese by Chinese youths. In a survey of 100,000 youths taken in 1996 by the China Youth News only “14 percent thought Japan-China relations were good, while 42 percent did not have a “favorable” impression of Japan.”¹⁴⁵ Japanese public opinion of China has been equally bad since the 1989 Tiananmen incident.

The constant “Japan bashing” in China has continued to be an obstacle to a resolution of the history issue, and as long as it continues, domestic support will be against issuing any additional apologies. Japanese concern was raised even higher by the near riots during the summer 2004 Asia Cup soccer games, when Japanese fans were kept in the stadium long after a match against China ended for their own safety while anti-Japanese protestors were dispersed, this was likely a contributing factor in the large drop in public opinion in 2004.¹⁴⁶ This anti-Japanese attitude among the Chinese population has grown beyond the government’s ability to control it and has created concern in both Beijing and Tokyo over the safety of Japanese athletes and spectators during the upcoming 2008 Olympics.

I. SUMMARY

Chinese response to the six case studies reveals an interesting pattern, as seen in Table 2. China is primarily opposed to moves seen by Japan as *nationalistic*, although the right to individual self-defense is not as strongly questioned. China is also opposed to the expansion of Japan’s military mission in a *global* environment. This is primarily due to the concern that global ambitions will lead to a resurgence of militarism in Japan. Considering Beijing’s concerns over national and global ambitions by China, it is interesting to note that China appears to accept Japan’s involvement in *regional* security affairs. This is most likely due to Japan’s open participation in regional security organizations and an understanding in Beijing that as long as Japan remains a regional power it will follow the lead of the United States. Japan’s moves into a global arena could indicate the creation of a truly independent security policy in Tokyo.

¹⁴⁵ The same report also listed Tojo Hideki as the most famous Japanese. Green, *Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power*, 97-98.

¹⁴⁶ *Japan Times*. “Public Opinion of China hits Record Low, National Poll Shows.” December 20, 2004. <http://202.221.217.59/print/news/nn12-2004/nn20041220a4.htm> (accessed March 4, 2005).

For the foreseeable future, the greatest impediment to improved security relations between Beijing and Tokyo will be the resolution of historical issues. Solving these problems is not something that Japan can do alone. In order for Japan and China to move beyond this diplomatic impasse created by historical issues, both sides must put forth good faith initiatives to resolve this issue. Japan must have greater understanding of how deep the historical issues run in China. Beijing, for its part, must be ready to abandon its use of historical issues as a foreign policy tool and work with Japan to truly resolve the issues.

		Global	Regional	National
Security Oriented Activities	Case Study	Afghanistan	PSI	Missile Defense
	Reaction	Concerned of Precedence	Reserved	Concerned of Expansion
Stability Oriented Activities	Case Study	Iraq	Tsunami Relief	Historical Issues
	Reaction	Opposed	Competition/Concern	Increasingly Hostile

Table 2. Chinese Perceptions of Japanese Stability and Security Activities

Security dialogues, such as the February 2004 six party talks and the 2003 Iraqi reconstruction meetings in Tokyo, have emphasized Japanese participation in regional and global security affairs. These efforts have brought praise by many nations, but also raised questions from many within the Chinese government and military about what the desired role Japan has for itself in world affairs. Fears of a reemergence of militarism similar to that which affected all of Asia in the first half of the 20th century will keep Chinese planners nervously eyeing Japanese improvements in the near term and continue to lead to harsh rhetoric portraying the Japanese as “bellicose, murderous and suicidal.”¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁷ Li Jijun, “On Strategic Culture,” *China Military*, no. 1 (1997).

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V. SOUTH KOREAN REACTIONS TO EXPANDING THE JSDF

While Japan–North Korea relations have traditionally concentrated on the desire to obtain security guarantees and Japan’s relations with China have often revolved around maintaining a balance of power, relations between Japan and South Korea have been much more complex. Japan and South Korea are both allies of the United States and therefore de facto allies of each other. At the same time, both are also increasingly regional economic and political competitors and suffer from a strong historical distrust. This has created a situation where Japan and South Korea’s security relationship is increasingly influenced by political actions in both Tokyo and Seoul. While the security relationship between the nations continues to be based on the threat from North Korea, the perception that each has of the situation is increasingly divergent. Japan sees North Korean brinkmanship as destabilizing to the region, yet the current South Korean administration sees little direct threat as long as North Korea remains unprovoked.

There are also differences in views of what is needed for broader regional security. Seoul’s views of expanding the JSDF mission have varied significantly since Tokyo initiated major changes in 1991. These responses, however, have been based more on how Seoul views Japan in the regional context than Japan’s actions directly. Specifically, there are three security relationships that influence Seoul’s opinion of Japan and the JSDF. First is how South Korea perceives U.S. global and regional policies. When the U.S. policy is seen as inconsistent with the best interest of South Korea, reaction to Japanese security activities that support the United States worsens. On the other hand, when Japan supports U.S. security policies that are in South Korea’s interests reaction—while not necessarily positive—is at least non-committal. The second key aspect of regional security for South Korea is its perception of China. While many South Korean leaders are increasingly pro-China, the lack of transparency in China’s military modernization could provide greater support for Japan’s defense build-up, which, while worrisome in historical perspective, is perceived as more transparent. The third factor is how South Korea views the threat from North Korea. When South Korea is concerned that the chance of a military confrontation with the North has grown, an increased

Japanese role in regional security mechanisms is encouraged. If, however, the view is that North Korea is not likely to threaten South Korea, the Japanese defense build-up can be seen as destabilizing to the region.¹⁴⁸

South Korea, like China, is concerned that the JSDF deployments overseas are a sign of current efforts in the Japanese government to develop an independent security policy. Japan, in the eyes of many South Koreans, is attempting to “become a nation capable of acting on what it considers necessary for its own national benefits, meaning it ultimately desires independence or sovereignty in political and military matters.”¹⁴⁹ Unlike China, South Korea has no interest in seeing the U.S.–Japan security relationship deteriorate. A fundamental shift in the U.S. security guarantees, coupled with Japan’s efforts at normalcy, would undoubtedly lead to the collapse of the post-war security system and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region. This would open up the possibility of a conflict with China and/or North Korea, with South Korea in the middle. In order to avoid such a scenario, South Korea continues actively to engage Japan in security manners whenever practical.

A. JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS

Japan and South Korea normalized relations in 1965. While initially the relationship was focused primarily on economic issues, South Korea being a major recipient of Japan’s ODA, Japan’s more active security policy in the 1990s along with the end of the Cold War brought about new opportunities for coordination on security issues. Intelligence exchanges and senior military-to-military visits between Japan and South Korea have occurred steadily since the mid-1990s, to the point where they are now considered commonplace. Japan and South Korea also conducted their first joint naval search and rescue exercise on August 4-5, 1999 between Cheju Do and Kyushu.¹⁵⁰ The exercise involving three ships from Japan and two from South Korea began with a two-day visit to Pusan and ended with a visit by the ships to Sasebo. The exercise received little coverage, either for or against, in South Korea. This lack of coverage is actually

¹⁴⁸ Hong, ed., *The Strategic Balance in Northeast Asia*, 2003, 196-197.

¹⁴⁹ Hong, ed., *The Strategic Balance in Northeast Asia*, 2003, 179.

¹⁵⁰ Shinobu Miyachi, “Korea-Japan Cooperation Can Stabilize and Balance the Alliances with the U.S.,” in *Korea-Japan Security Relations: Prescriptive Studies*, ed. Rhee Sang-woo and Kim Tae-hyo (Seoul, Korea: New Asia Research Institute, 2000), 259-260.

seen as indication of the improving relations between the countries. Japanese press, on the other hand, widely reported the exercise as “the start of a new era” in Japan-South Korean relations.¹⁵¹

Even with improving bilateral relations, the security of Japan and South Korea both remains intertwined with the United States, for not only does a U.S. presence in Korea have the effect of deterring North Korean aggression, but the presence of U.S. troops in Korea also is seen in Japan as keeping “South Korea within the U.S.–Japan orbit—as a partner, not a satellite—and insuring that when unification takes place, the entire peninsula remains aligned with Japan and the United States.”¹⁵² South Korea is also interested in maintaining the U.S. presence in Japan, partly in order to ensure Japan’s logistical support in the event of a conflict with North Korea, but also to ensure that the United States will keep Japan from exerting its own influence too strongly in the region.

Even though South Korea is interested in a stable U.S.–Japanese strategic partnership, there has often been concern that the relationship would result in the abandonment of Seoul, or at least of its interests. This suspicion grew in 1997 with the signing of the revised guidelines for defense cooperation between the United States and Japan. South Korea reacted carefully to the new guidelines, eventually announcing its “support with caution.”¹⁵³ The concern most expressed in Seoul was that the loose definition of SIASJ could “interfere with the interests of a third country” (namely South Korea) and could be “interpreted as a tactic for containing China” resulting in a regional conflict.¹⁵⁴ Although a bilateral agreement, there was extensive coordination with South Korea to include trilateral meetings in March and May 1997, and April 1998 to assuage fears of abandonment. This agreement also likely gave impetus for South Korea and Japan to update their own bilateral security policy, which had been in place since the

¹⁵¹ Miyachi, “Korea-Japan Cooperation Can Stabilize and Balance the Alliances with the U.S.,” 260.

¹⁵² Robert Dujarric. “Japan’s Security Needs U.S. Troops in S. Korea.” Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI), *International Herald Tribune / The Asahi Shimbun*, July 12, 2004. <http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/papers/contribution/dujarric/02.html> (accessed November 30, 2004).

¹⁵³ Akihisa Nagashima. “Searching for a Korean-Japanese Strategic Partnership: Nucleus of a Trans-Pacific Security Community.” *Institute for Corean-American Studies*, November 12, 1998. <http://www.icasinc.org/lectures/aknl1998.html> (accessed February 28, 2005).

¹⁵⁴ Kathleen J. Brahney, ed. “U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines: Fears of a ‘Provoked’ China, a ‘Remilitarized’ Japan.” *Federation of American Scientists*, October 6, 1997. http://www.fas.org/news/japan/97100601_rmr.html (accessed March 2, 2005).

initial normalization talks in 1965. The “Japan-ROK Joint Declaration on a New Partnership toward the Twenty-first Century” was signed in Tokyo on October 8, 1998. The joint declaration and accompanying 43-point implementation plan covered a wide range of issues to include fisheries agreements and an understanding to try to resolve the Takeshima/Tokdo island dispute.¹⁵⁵ Most importantly it helped to establish bilateral security cooperation and expand military exchanges.

The recent announcements to permanently move the U.S. headquarters away from the DMZ, reassign 3,600 U.S. troops from South Korea to Iraq in August 2004 and the long term reduction of U.S. Army presence from 37,000 to 24,000 by September 2008 have been cause for concern in both Korea and Japan.¹⁵⁶ Reaction to the reduction in both Tokyo and Seoul has been reminiscent of the attempt during the Carter administration by the United States to reduce Korean force levels. At the time, the Carter proposal to consolidate forces back in the United States and remove the U.S. presence on the Korean peninsula was heavily protested by Japan and South Korea. South Korean influence in Washington was limited, but a coordinated effort by Japanese and Korean lobbies contributed to getting the proposal shelved. An unintended consequence of the Carter proposal was the forging of closer relations between Tokyo and Seoul. Reaction to the current round of relocations has been lessened by active engagement by the Bush administration to negotiate changes to the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) structure. In 2003 alone there were numerous meetings to discuss the realignment of forces between U.S. and Korean senior defense and political officials.¹⁵⁷ These talks, while separate from those occurring between Tokyo and Washington, are often the subject of conversation between Japanese and Korean defense officials.

Concern in both nations is that a withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region could embolden China to exert its power. These fears were further fueled in Japan following the election of South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun and the rise of the Uri party. Prior to the 2004 National Assembly elections in South Korea, 187 of 273 standing assemblymen

¹⁵⁵ Nagashima. “Searching for a Korean-Japanese Strategic Partnership: Nucleus of a Trans-Pacific Security Community.”

¹⁵⁶ Larry A. Niksch, “Korea: U.S.-Korean Relations – Issues for Congress,” in *CRS Issue Brief for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2004), 14.

¹⁵⁷ Hong, ed., *The Strategic Balance in Northeast Asia, 2003*, 369-374.

participated in the Japan-South Korea Parliamentary Friendship League, yet after the rise of the Uri party there remain only 62 members with ties to the League. In addition, in a recent poll of Uri party members about foreign policy priorities, a much higher emphasis was placed with China (63 percent) then with Japan (2 percent).¹⁵⁸

While the election of the Uri party in South Korea has brought Seoul and Beijing closer, there is still concern in Seoul that the rapid military build-up in China is a sign of Beijing's desire to further wield its power. Seoul now finds itself in the middle of what it perceives as two rising powers in Asia. This has led to a policy that seeks to minimize confrontation between China and Japan. Unfortunately, Japan's recent statements that identify China as a security concern are unsettling to Seoul. Although worried over the potential for a future conflict, most analysts rule out the possibility of such an occurrence until after the 2008 Olympics and 2010 World Exposition, both to be hosted by China. For South Korea, the possibility of the United States and Japan provoking action from North Korea is a more immediate concern.

Most recently, the 2004 NDPO and the 2005 United States–Japan joint statement have gone farther in identifying the threat posed directly from the North Korean nuclear program. Seoul was careful not to upset the current United States–Japan partnership by opposing the NDPO. Instead, it limited its response to an unnamed official in the Foreign Affairs and Trade Ministry who called for more transparency with respect to defense policy guidelines in light of concerns about Japan's militaristic past.¹⁵⁹ The greatest concern to Seoul was the declaration of North Korea as “a significantly unstable factor in regional security and a serious problem for global nonproliferation efforts.”¹⁶⁰ The February 2005 joint statement, on the other hand, was virtually ignored in South Korean press and diplomatic reporting. Instead, greater emphasis was placed on the trilateral coordination to bring North Korea back to the six-party talks that occurred the following week. Even though Seoul often disagrees with joint U.S.–Japan policy regarding North Korea, Japan is cautious to coordinate with Seoul on most security issues involving North

¹⁵⁸ Cha. “Nuclear Sea of Fire.”

¹⁵⁹ *Japan Times*. “Seoul Airs Concern.” December 12, 2004. <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20041212a1.htm> (accessed December 13, 2004).

¹⁶⁰ *People's Daily Online*. “Japan's New Defense Outline to be Effective from April 2005.”

Korea.¹⁶¹ For example, Japan-North Korea normalization talks, which started in 1991, were heavily coordinated with South Korea in order to ensure that they proceeded at “a pace acceptable to Seoul.”¹⁶² Although some coordination regarding the North Korean nuclear issues occurs bilaterally, most is conducted through the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) between the United States, Japan, and South Korea, which was initiated in March 1999. During the January 2004 TCOG meeting, a consensus was reached that obtained Seoul’s commitment to the “complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement” on North Korea’s nuclear program.¹⁶³

Although there are often agreements on security policy direction, the means by which policy is implemented is still cause for disagreement between Tokyo and Seoul, as was seen during the recent Trilateral Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Japan, China, and South Korea that took place in Vientiane on November 27, 2004. While dealing mostly with legal consultation, security issues such as the current North Korean nuclear crisis and United Nations reform were also discussed. When the Japanese Foreign Minister broached the subject of North Korea, South Korean Foreign Minister Ban “stated that it was very frustrating that nuclear development in North Korea has continued to be an issue of concern,” indication that South Korea’s sense of urgency regarding the crisis differs greatly from that in Japan.¹⁶⁴ Defense meetings have often yielded the same result. A recent example of this is the November 2003 meeting between Director General of JDA Ishiba Shigeru and his counterpart the South Korean Defense Minister Cho Young-kil. In the meeting Cho stressed the importance of patience in dealing with the North, while Ishiba highlighted the need for “pressure” to complement diplomacy in order to modify North Korea’s behavior.¹⁶⁵ This inability to see eye-to-eye has often led to tension that can be exacerbated by other issues that remain unresolved between Seoul and Tokyo.

¹⁶¹ Some issues such as the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korean agents are handled by Japan bilaterally, much to the disappointment of Seoul.

¹⁶² Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power*, 115.

¹⁶³ Japan, South Korea and the United States also coordinate regularly in security issues outside of the TCOG framework. Cha. “Happy Birthday Mr. Kim.”

¹⁶⁴ Nihon Gaimushou (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs). “The Trilateral Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Japan, the People's Republic of China, and the Republic of Korea.”

¹⁶⁵ Cha. “It's the Economy (and Culture), Stupid.”

In addition to disagreements over security issues on the Korean peninsula, South Korea has also remained cautious of Japan's effort to increase its global standing. Many in Seoul see that the establishment of an independent foreign policy in Japan as portending a future break in the U.S.–Japan security relationship. Seoul's response to Japan's push for a permanent position on the United Nations Security Council is evidence of this. In late 2001, South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon revealed South Korea's support for expanding the non-permanent member seats in the UNSC, but not the permanent seats, an effective way to express its unease over Japan's bid for a permanent seat without directly criticizing Japan.¹⁶⁶

Even with differences in policy implementation, coordination and contact continues between the two governments. High-level talks continue even when relations deteriorate. The relationship between Prime Minister Koizumi and President Roh, while not friendly, is still solid. The meeting between the two leaders held on December 17, to discuss options for restarting the six-party talks was the 8th since President Roh took office in February 2003.¹⁶⁷ Many exchanges also occur below the radar of typical press coverage. According to an itinerary posted on the JMSDF website, the South Korean Chief of Naval Operations visited Tokyo for four days in January 2005, but yet the visit received no observable press coverage in either country.¹⁶⁸ Opportunities exist for the Japan–South Korea security relationship to improve as both become more involved in regional and international security forums and operations. Critical to this will be not only maintaining, but also expanding military confidence building measures to ensure that South Korea does not become overly suspicious of Japanese efforts to expand the JSDF.

B. SOUTH KOREAN DIPLOMATIC AND SECURITY OPTIONS

Japan and South Korea coordinate a wide range of issues through formal and informal diplomatic channels at all levels of government. The most important means for coordinating policy is the open communication between the leaders of South Korea and

¹⁶⁶ Cha. "Nuclear Sea of Fire."

¹⁶⁷ Hwang Doo-hyong. "Roh's Summit With Koizumi to Focus on N. Korea's Nukes, Trade: Aide." December 15, 2004. <http://english.yna.co.kr/Engnews/20041215/320000000020041215140731E8.html> (accessed December 14, 2004).

¹⁶⁸ *Nihon Kaijiteitai* (Japan Maritime Self Defense Force). "Daikan Minkoku Kaigun Sambou Sochou ni Koushiki Shotai ni Tsuite (Invitation to the South Korean Chief of Naval Operations)." January 25, 2005. <http://www.jda.go.jp/JMSDF/info/news/17news/17012501.html> (accessed January 29, 2005).

Japan. While relations between the two countries are not always the best, the dialogue between senior civilian and uniformed personnel has remained open. In addition to the bilateral relationship, the shared security relationship with the United States provides another means to coordinate and discuss security policy. Unlike China and North Korea, the South Korean press is not censored. While the government can issue press reports like those in any other free democracy, the slant on the statements varies according to the ideological leanings of the various news outlets, often making it easy to confuse opinion with policy. Japan and South Korea have also opened up to each other's culture. In the late 1990s, South Korea recently lifted a ban on Japanese cultural material, allowing for Japanese television programs and movies to be shown in South Korea. South Korea is also exporting its own cultural achievements to Japan. This greater exchange of culture has helped to increase trust and understanding among the populace and decrease fears of the others intentions.¹⁶⁹

C. COUNTER-TERRORISM OPERATIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

Japan and South Korea, as key allies of the United States in Asia, were in unique positions to support the global war on terrorism. The attacks on New York and Washington brought home the possibility of terrorist attacks occurring anywhere. While both Japan and South Korea have a fairly small Muslim population, both were concerned of the possibility of Al Qaida conducting an attack. The revelation that Al Qaida members travel to Japan and the inclusion of South Korea and Japan on the list of Al Qaida target countries helped to solidify this support. South Korean response to the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures law and the deployment of the JMSDF to the Indian Ocean was notably absent. This was likely due to a combination of South Korean support for the United States and extensive efforts by Prime Minister Koizumi to ensure the transparency of the deployment. In the view of Seoul, the JMSDF deployment to the Indian Ocean has also helped to solidify the U.S.–Japan security partnership, ensuring that Japan remains firmly in the U.S. sphere of influence. The deployment overseas into

¹⁶⁹ In my discussion with many younger Koreans, it is their common consensus that the liberalization of the press and the import of Japanese cultural material have helped many younger Koreans to see the positive role that Japan played in supporting Korea's current economic progress in the later part of the 20th century.

“uncharted waters” is however viewed with a mix of concern and admiration. The JMSDF was able to conduct sustained blue water operations in support of up to 40 coalition vessels, a feat that the South Korean Navy could not have accomplished.

While future expansion by the JMSDF in support of global security operations will likely raise concern that Japan is once again pushing to become a global economic and military power, if conducted in support of a wide-ranging coalition South Korean official reaction will remain guarded. If Japan, on the other hand, is seen as pursuing its own self-interest, then it will likely be met with greater suspicion and likely protest from Seoul.

D. IRAQI STABILITY OPERATIONS

Both Tokyo and Seoul expressed support for rebuilding efforts in Iraq. Japan provided the second largest contribution of financial aid and South Korea the third largest in manpower when in February 2004, the South Korean national assembly approved the dispatch of 3,000 troops to Northern Iraq by a vote of 155-50-7.¹⁷⁰ Although the South Korean government passed the legislation easily, the deployment to Iraq was still domestically unpopular. The fact that the deployment of the JSDF was unpopular in Japan created a perception that the United States was pressuring both Japan and South Korea to join the coalition in order to add legitimacy. This kindred sense of victimization, a sort of combined *higaisha ishiki*, helped to soften South Korean public reaction to the Japanese deployment. Nonetheless, the Seoul remains nervous about Japan’s eagerness to expand its mission overseas. There are also increasing fears that the United States has started playing a more active role in encouraging Japan’s militarization rather than “keeping the cork on the bottle.” Future deployments in stability operations will likely be judged on a case-by-case basis in Seoul, those that Seoul actively participates in will be met with little criticism. Once again, however, if Japan is seen as pursuing its own self-interest or if the United States is seen as pressuring the JSDF to expand beyond a defensive role, the response will be much more negative.

E. PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI)

The PSI is an extremely sensitive subject in Seoul, considering the direct impact it could have on South Korea. As such, South Korea has been careful to distance itself

¹⁷⁰ Cha. “Happy Birthday Mr. Kim.”

from the Initiative. Although U.S. military officials have suggested South Korean involvement in non-proliferation measures, Seoul has not joined the PSI, nor has it been invited to the 2003 and 2004 regional exercises.¹⁷¹ The diplomatic impact that South Korean involvement would have on both bilateral normalization talks and on the six-party talks would be far reaching. North Korea would view the South's participation in the initiative as a hostile act and would likely use it as a further excuse to delay talks. The situation would be even more complex if South Korea were even indirectly involved in the seizure of North Korean WMD material as part of a PSI framework. North Korea has repeatedly expressed its position that any seizure of North Korean cargo would be interpreted as an act of war. While the ability of North Korea to impact the United States is limited, South Korea could quickly become the target of North Korean hostility.

Due to South Korea's position regarding the PSI, it is difficult to judge the perception of Japanese participation in the initiative. While not opposing Japan's involvement, it is likely that South Korea will continue to remain cautious of any movement by Japan that is seen as isolating the North Korean regime. Although not directly related to the PSI, the issue of unilateral economic sanction suggested by Tokyo against North Korea is a good indicator of Seoul's concerns. Uri party chairman Lee Bu-young stated that economic sanctions could initiate "something unwanted by both Japan and South Korea."¹⁷² These unintended consequences are exactly the reason South Korea has not joined the PSI and remains cautious of implementation in Northeast Asia.

F. TSUNAMI RELIEF

Like Japan, Korea has also responded to the tsunami relief efforts with naval and air deployments of its own. Two Korean tank landing ships (the same class as the Japanese ship) and one air force transport made deliveries to Sri Lanka and Indonesia in early 2005.¹⁷³ South Korea has been careful to match Japanese contributions, if not in quantity, at least in scope. Situations such as peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations are areas that Japan and South Korea not only can cooperate in, but also

¹⁷¹ Cossa et al. "Countering the Spread of WMD: The Role of the PSI."

¹⁷² Kang. "Improving and Maturing, but Slowly."

¹⁷³ Embassy of Korea in the United States. "Navy Ship Delivers Relief Goods to Sri Lanka." February 15, 2005. http://www.koreaembassyusa.org/newspress/dsp_newspress.cfm?relid=2330&type=1 (accessed February 18, 2005).

compete in. Neither Seoul nor Tokyo wants to be perceived as unresponsive to regional crises and concerns. As a result, both countries are careful to gauge the other's involvement and will remain open to all aspects of support. At the same time it is likely that Korean defense officials are carefully monitoring the deployment of Japan's largest ship in support of a joint JMSDF and JGSDF operation. In Seoul's view, these incremental advances in capabilities could pave the way for more direct JSDF involvement in regional security affairs.

G. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Seoul's view of ballistic missile defense is different from that of its neighbors. North Korea and China see the system as an attempt to undermine their deterrence capabilities. Without a ballistic missile force, Tokyo perceives the system as one of the few options to protect it from North Korean or Chinese attacks. South Korea, although initially having planned to deploy Patriot PAC-3 missiles as a missile defense, perceives the system as little help in protecting Seoul from the literally thousands of artillery pieces in range of the capital. Therefore, Japan's moves to develop the system, along with statements made that Japan would not participate in collective defense with the system, has reinforced the perception that Japan is seeking only to defend itself from foreign aggression. Similar steps to improve Japan's defense capability will likely be met with little response by Seoul.

H. RESOLUTION OF HISTORICAL ISSUES

The deadlock over understanding a consistent concept of security in Northeast Asia between Tokyo and Seoul can most likely be traced back to an event not related to security. The government of Japan's approval of a controversial history textbook severely damaged and resulted in anti-Japanese protests over "textbooks that allegedly gloss over atrocities by Japanese soldiers during World War II."¹⁷⁴ As a result of differences in "historical perception" scheduled visits by the *JMS Kashima* and *JMS Yamagiri* to Inchon were cancelled during the summer 2001 training cruise.¹⁷⁵ South Korean President Kim Dae-jung announced his "shock" over the Japanese governments refusal to revise the textbooks. He went on state his concern that "all the efforts I have

¹⁷⁴ Masalski. "Examining the Japanese History Textbook Controversies."

¹⁷⁵ *Tokyo Sankei Shimbun*. "ROK not to Allow Japan's MSDF to Call at Inchon Port Due to Textbook Issue." FBIS English Translation, August 22, 2001. <https://www.fbis.gov/> (accessed December 11, 2004).

made so far to build a truly friendly relationship with Japan may have to go back to square one.”¹⁷⁶ The aftermath of this event was a rising anti-Japanese nationalism in South Korea, which is exacerbated by visits of Prime Minister Koizumi to the Yasukuni Jinja. This anti-Japanese feeling was also felt at the 2002 Soccer World Cup, when the South Korean fans cheered wildly at Japan’s loss in the semi-finals, a scene that received much coverage in Japanese press.¹⁷⁷ In addition, historical issues revolving around Japanese high school textbooks, anti-Korean comments by Japanese politicians and claims of Japanese intransigence over the visits to Yasukuni Jinja by Japanese Prime Ministers continue to impede relations.¹⁷⁸ President Roh, regarded as essentially pragmatic in his policies, was careful not to press the history issue early in his administration, stating that it was not “desirable for the South Korean government to force it.”¹⁷⁹

Unlike China and North Korea, South Korea is attempting to work constructively with Japan to resolve historical issues. During the December 2004 South Korea–Japan foreign ministers summit, South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon reiterated President Roh’s hope that Japan would deal with the history issue on its own initiative and that the joint history study would be continued.¹⁸⁰ South Korea and Japan continue to try to reach a common understanding of history issues. President Roh visited the Emperor during his visit to Japan on June 6, 2003, Korea’s memorial day for soldiers who have died in the service of their country.¹⁸¹ The Emperor also has attempted to ease tensions by highlighting the kinship between Japan and Korea, most significantly was the announcement in December 2001 that the imperial line had blood relations with the

¹⁷⁶ *CNN.com*. “South Korea Cuts Japan Ties in Book Standoff.” July 12, 2001. <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/07/12/skorea.japan.textwar/> (accessed November 10, 2004).

¹⁷⁷ Allan Song. “History 1, Soccer 0.” In *PacNet Newsletter, Pacific Forum CSIS*, July 19, 2002. <http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0228A.htm> (accessed December 8, 2004).

¹⁷⁸ Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintarou is infamous for comments such as those made on November 1, 2003 that Koreans “chose” Japanese rule rather than face Chinese or Russian governance when Japan annexed the Korean Peninsula in 1910. See: Cha. “It’s the Economy (and Culture), Stupid.”

¹⁷⁹ Hwang Doo-hyong. “Roh’s Summit With Koizumi to Focus on N. Korea’s Nukes, Trade: Aide.”

¹⁸⁰ Kang. “Improving and Maturing, but Slowly.”

¹⁸¹ Michael Yoo. “Japan-Korea Relations.” Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI), *Asahi Shimbun*, June 12, 2003. <http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/papers/contribution/yoo/01.html> (accessed November 30, 2004).

Korean peninsula.¹⁸² Although the planned visit by the Emperor to Korea for the 2002 World Cup soccer matches did not occur, the possibility remains that such a visit could occur in the near term. It is likely that, if timed correctly, the visit could help to relieve many of the suspicions that Koreans have of the Emperor, a figure that brought fear to Koreans during the occupation in the early twentieth century and Japanese in general.¹⁸³




Figure 3. Japanese Public Opinion of South Korea¹⁸⁴

On the whole, Japanese and South Korean opinion has been improving steadily since the mid 1990s. (Figure 3) Greater exchange of cultural and increased cooperation between the governments has helped to improve this view. In addition in recent years Japan has been the rise of *hanryu* (Korean wave). This has been amplified due to the recent popularity of the South Korea soap opera, *Winter Sonata*, which has recently been

¹⁸² Yoo. "Japan-Korea Relations."

¹⁸³ Many Koreans still carry the same concerns and fears of the Japanese Imperial family, even though Emperor Showa (Hirohito) has been succeeded by Emperor Akihito,

¹⁸⁴ After: *Nihon Naikakufu Daijin Kanbou Seifu Kouhoushitsu* (Japan Cabinet Office Secretariat Public Relations Department). "Gaikou ni Kan Suru Yoron Chousa (The Public Opinion Poll Regarding Diplomacy)."

airing on the official Japanese television station, NHK.¹⁸⁵ It is still too early to see how relations in 2005 will turn out. Continued disputes over a new draft of the history textbook as well as the reemergence of the Takeshima/Tokdo dispute could indicate a worsening of relations. On the other hand, 2005 is the 40th anniversary of the normalization of relations between Seoul and Tokyo. Japan is also hosting the World Expo in Aichi in 2005, and has extended visa waivers to Beijing, Taipei and Seoul during the course of the exposition. Both of these events has the possibility of improving the trust between Japan and South Korea, making future changes to Japan's security structure more acceptable.

I. SUMMARY

As summarized in Table 3 below, Seoul appears to accept the inevitable increase in Japan's role in *regional* and *global* security and stability affairs. But it remains cautious of attempts to do so outside the U.S.–Japan security framework. South Korea's experience with North Korea over the past 50 years has shaped Seoul's view that *national* security issues are not seen as threatening to stability of the region. The major concern that Seoul has regarding Tokyo is operations outside of the U.S.–Japan security framework. Historical issues and territorial disputes when handled bilaterally have caused tension in the relationship between Japan and South Korea. An expansion of bilateral military, economic and cultural exchanges can help to improve this mutual distrust. While Japan and the South Korea remain engaged in security matters, outside factors such as Japanese historical issues have often caused security relations to be temporarily interrupted. South Korea and Japan have made some headway recently to keep this issue from interfering with security issues, but an underlying resentment remains. In order for relations to truly progress, Japan must develop a plan that addresses concerns that both the South Korean government and nationalist elements within the Japanese government have over the treatment of historical issues.

¹⁸⁵ Kang. "Improving and Maturing, but Slowly."

		Global	Regional	National
Security Oriented Activities	Case Study	Afghanistan	PSI	Missile Defense
	Reaction	Cautious support	Concerns of Escalation	Acceptance
Stability Oriented Activities	Case Study	Iraq	Tsunami Relief	Historical Issues
	Reaction	Cautious support	Competition and Balance	Diplomatic and Public Pressure

Table 3. South Korean Perceptions of Japanese Stability and Security Activities

It is unlikely that there are any major obstacles in the Korean peninsula to initiatives to expand the scope and capability of the Japan Self Defense Forces. Seoul will, however, likely remain suspicious of Japanese motives while historical issues remain unresolved. Reaching an acceptable compromise on these issues will be difficult, but as greater cultural and economic exchanges such as the proposed Free Trade Agreement become closer to a reality greater trust will continue to grow. Cultural trust will not only decrease suspicion of the expanding JSDF mission, but will also head off concerns over a perceived revival of Japanese militarism. Seoul will need to understand that growing Japanese nationalism does not mean growing militarism. Expansion of confidence-building measures with the South Korean military will be critical to ensuring that the Seoul does not become apprehensive of Japanese security efforts. Seoul and Tokyo will, however, need to ensure that these exchanges are not seen as overly threatening to North Korea. As the South Korea–Japan relationship improves, it is likely that North Korea will attempt to drive a wedge between Seoul and Tokyo.

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VI. CONCLUSION - MANAGING GLOBAL PERCEPTIONS

Changes to the mission of the JSDF can improve the stability of the region, but to do this they must be done in cooperation with regional partners. An active and open security dialogue is essential to reducing fears and suspicions of a new militarization of Japan. Increased cultural exchanges also have a similar effect on reducing tensions. Upcoming events, such as the 2005 World Expo in Aichi, the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, and the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai all have the potential to bring the three major powers of Northeast Asia closer together, but any major incidents occurring at these events have the potential to create a serious public backlash.

A. REGIONAL VIEWS OF THE JSDF

Relations between Japan and the Korean Peninsula have long been troubled due to cultural misunderstandings and conflicting views of security, yet Japanese and Korean security issues are intertwined and often inseparable. South Korea has emerged as a growing economic power and democratic nation, and North Korea's isolation has led to fits of nuclear brinkmanship and threats to turn Tokyo into a "sea of fire." North Korean actions have provided almost daily reminders to the Japanese public of the potential threat from one of Japan's closest neighbors and are one of the forces legitimizing the rapid changes in the Japanese defense structure. South Korea, on the other hand, has worked to try and improve relations with Japan in order to ensure that it is not left out of the U.S. security apparatus. This has opened the two countries to greater cooperation and has been key to improving trust between the nations. Chinese views of Japan have been influenced by the government's use of historical issues as a negotiating tool. This has created an extremely negative opinion of Japanese in China and a strong distrust of the JSDF.

B. IMPLEMENTATION OF NORMALIZATION EFFORTS

Transformation and eventual "normalization" of the Self Defense Forces in order to meet regional and global security commitments can be accomplished without upsetting the regional balance of power. To do this, Japan must maintain a strict commitment to global peace and the "three non-nuclear principles." Revisions to the constitution that

allow greater participation in international efforts can occur without removing references to the renunciation of belligerency as a right of the state. Because Japan's growing military involvement in world affairs will provoke concerns among regional neighbors, these perceptions must be considered and a concerted effort at transparency maintained. The key to developing an internationally recognized military presence will be *gradual* changes in capabilities and mission and increased security cooperation with South Korea and China.

Non-military political issues, such as visits by Prime Minister Koizumi to the Yasukuni Jinja and textbook issues, can complicate efforts. Japan has many tough decisions regarding establishing priorities between domestic concerns and international participation. By yielding to nationalist elements attempting to redefine Japan's history Tokyo jeopardizes its ability to work with regional neighbors to solve various crises. Japan must be careful in dealing with historical issues and should actively press engagement with Seoul and Beijing when relations become tense. Only through an active role can Japan help to diffuse tensions in the region. Active engagement with regional partners can not only help to resolve outstanding security issues but also can improve Japan's international standing. Japan must be ready for the worst, but endeavor for the best. As the word for crisis, *kiki* (危機) expresses in Japanese, Chinese and Korean, future efforts can bring about both danger (危) and opportunity (機).

C. OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. SUPPORT TO JSDF EXPANSION

The U.S.–Japan Security relationship remains a pivotal aspect of the U.S. security strategy in Asia. The relationship has, however, grown more complex with the end of the Cold War. As the Japanese military moves into greater global responsibilities, internal and external cultural obstacles emerged. Questions about the legality and limit of deployments are far from being answered and will greatly influence the path that Japan will take with regards to constitutional reforms. Every year brings new changes to the relationship and more responsibilities to both partners. With continued support from the United States, Japan can become not just an assistant in maintaining peace and stability, but a true regional and even global partner. This can, perhaps, best be summed up by the experiences of ex-Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who during a recent interview said:

I've been involved in U.S.–Japan relations since 1967 when I first went to Japan, and I think I can say that every single year U.S.–Japan relations have gotten more important, not less. I'm not talking just about kindness of Japan and Japanese citizens in hosting U.S. forces. I'm talking about the full relationship—the economic, political, cultural; the way we cooperate on many issues across the globe has become more important. I'm quite proud of it.¹⁸⁶

The goal of the United States in the mid-term should be to increase the trust and understanding that Asian nations regarding Japanese intentions. Washington should, therefore, continue to *reaffirm the importance of the United States–Japan security structure*. Although the United States has continued to place emphasis on maintaining the security partnership with both South Korea and Japan, a force drawdown or restructuring in Northeast Asia should be undertaken such that there is no question of the willingness of the United States to ensure peace and stability. A sudden, unilateral withdrawal of forces from Japan would bring many U.S. security partnerships into question. The withdrawal of U.S. forces would create a destabilizing security vacuum in Asia. A new arms race in Asia would likely result, possibly leading to a regional conflict between increasingly modern military powers.

Also of concern would be Japan's reaction to the use of U.S. bases in Japan. The U.S.–Japan Security Treaty states: “For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the U.S. is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.”¹⁸⁷ The “Far East” has traditionally been defined as areas of the western Pacific, north of the Philippines. Theoretically this would limit the ability of forces assigned to Japan to operate outside of that clearly defined “Far East” area. This definition has, in reality, often been ignored, as units stationed in Japan have often take part in operations outside of the Far East, a rapid expansion of the mission area of forces assigned to Japan could be cause make Japanese efforts at transparency more difficult.

¹⁸⁶ Richard L Armitage. “Interview of Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage with Takao Hishinuma of the Yomiuri Shimbun.” November 30, 2004.
<http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2004/Dec/02-176511.html> (accessed December 5, 2004).

¹⁸⁷ “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan.”

The United States should also *encourage greater participation by Japan in both regional and global security operations and dialogues*. Key among these will be in forums that increase cooperation between Japan, China and both Koreas. Confidence-building measures will also be critical to ensure that other nations in the region do not become overly suspicious of Japanese and American security efforts. Greater Japanese leadership in regional and global affairs will also decrease the burden on the United States, allowing for greater involvement in other affairs throughout the globe. In addition to the trilateral meetings, Japan must be encouraged to take a greater role in regional security mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the United States should continue to press actively for Japan's attainment of a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Development of stronger ties with Russia, South Korea, and/or China can also reduce the need for the United States to provide a security guarantee for Japan. Such a move would however require Japan to resolve many issues that have hindered its relations with all three countries. Japan–Russia relations have stagnated over the disposition of the four “Northern Territory” islands claimed by Japan, but occupied by Russia since the end of World War II. This incident has dragged on without resolution and actually inhibited the signing of an official peace treaty. As shown throughout this thesis, relations with South Korea and China continue to be strained.

Finally, the long-term goal of the United States has been, and is the eventual “normalization” of Japan as a nation with a commensurate increase in its role in maintaining the peace and stability of Asia. In order to do this the United States should *prepare Japan and South Korea for the eventual decrease in U.S. forces in Northeast Asia*. As greater requirements are being placed on United States military assets throughout the world, the United States will be more dependent on its allies to help provide security. In the event of another major regional crisis outside of the Pacific, there is a high possibility that additional forces could be removed from Northeast Asia. In such a situation, Japan must be in a position both diplomatically and militarily to provide for its own defense and support the overall stability of the region and not upset the regional balance.

APPENDIX A: TIMELINE OF EVENTS AFFECTING JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY, MARCH 1990 TO JANUARY 2005

Date	Event
March 2, 1990	Soviet Union agrees to withdrawal of forces from Mongolia
June 4-5, 1990	Cambodian Peace Conference in Tokyo
August 2, 1990	Iraq invades Kuwait
August 30, 1990	Japan offers \$1 billion for restoration of peace in the Middle East
September 14, 1990	Japan increases offer to \$3 billion for peace restoration in the Middle East
October 16, 1990	Bill on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations submitted to Diet
November 10, 1990	Bill on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations fails to pass
November 12, 1990	JSDF takes part in <i>sokui no rei</i> (Emperor's accession) ceremony
December 20, 1990	Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) for 1991-1995 approved by Cabinet
January 17, 1991	Operation Desert Storm commences
January 24, 1991	Japan pledges an additional \$9 billion for efforts to restore peace to the Middle East
January 25, 1991	Cabinet approves ordinance on interim measures for the airlifting of Arabian Gulf refugees
February 28, 1991	Coalition forces involved in Operation Desert Storm cease combat operations
April 26, 1991	Six JMSDF minesweepers dispatched to Arabian Gulf
July 10, 1991	Russian President Boris Yeltsin takes office
September 17, 1991	South and North Korea simultaneously admitted to United Nations
October 6, 1991	JSDF personnel assist United Nations teams in chemical weapon inspections
February 25, 1992	China enacts Territorial Waters Act, designating the Senkaku Islands as part of China
May 25, 1992	IAEA officials make first inspection of North Korean Nuclear facilities
June 29, 1992	Revision of Law Concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams enacted
July 2, 1992	United States announces the complete withdrawal of ground and sea based tactical nuclear weapons from overseas
August 10, 1992	International Peace Cooperation Law in Effect
September 17, 1992 – September 26, 1993	JSDF participates in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)
October 23-28, 1992	Emperor and Empress visit China

Date	Event
November 24, 1992	United States completes withdrawal of armed forces from the Philippines
December 18, 1992	Cabinet approves change to MTDP for 1991-1995
January 13, 1993	Japan signs the Convention on the prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons (CWC)
March 12, 1993	North Korea announces withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
May 11, 1993 – January 8, 1995	JSDF participates in the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)
May 29, 1993	North Korea conducts Ballistic Missile test in the Sea of Japan
June 11, 1993	North Korea announces that they “reserve the right” to withdraw from the NPT
March 1, 1994	First Japan-China security dialogue in Beijing
March 3-14, 1994	IAEA inspections of seven North Korean nuclear facilities
March 31, 1994	UNSC adopts resolution urging North Korea to complete nuclear inspections
April 4, 1994	North Korea rejects UNSC resolution
July 8, 1994	North Korean Leader Kim-Il Sung dies
July 25, 1994	First ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Bangkok
September 17, 1994 – December 28, 1994	JSDF dispatched to Zaire to assist Rwandan refugees
October 21, 1994	Agreed Framework between United States and North Korea signed
November 9, 1994	First Japan-ROK working level defense policy dialogue held in Seoul
January 17, 1995	JSDF participates in disaster relief for Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake
March 9, 1995	Korean peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) established
March 20, 1995	JSDF dispatched in response to Sarin gas attack in Tokyo by Aum Shinrikyo
June 5, 1995	Japan and South Korea begin to establish measures to prevent accidents between military aircraft
June 9, 1995–December 14, 1995	Security Council of Japan conducts 13 meetings on the state of future defense capabilities
November 19, 1995	Prime Minister Murayama and Vice President Gore agree to the establishment of the Special Action Committee on Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (SACO)
November 28, 1995	Cabinet approves National Defense Program Outline (NDPO)
December 15, 1995	Cabinet approves MTDP for 1996-2000
March 8-25, 1996	China conducts major exercise opposite Taiwan

Date	Event
March 23, 1996	Taiwan hosts first direct Presidential election
April 17, 1996	Japan and United States issue Joint Declaration on Security
July 20, 1996	United Nations Treaty on the Law of the Seas goes into effect in Japan
July 29, 1996	China conducts nuclear test prior to declaring moratorium
September 2-6, 1996	First visit of JMSDF ship to South Korea
September 10, 1996	United nations General Assembly adopts Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
September 18, 1996	North Korean mini-submarine runs aground off South Korea
December 2, 1996	SACO final report approved by Joint United States–Japan Security Council
December 13, 1996	First Japan-Russia defense official cooperation meeting
December 24, 1996	Cabinet approves response plan for foreign submarines traveling underwater in Japanese territorial waters
January 20, 1997	Establishment of Japan Defense Intelligence Headquarters
March 14, 1997	China enacts national Defense Law
July 1, 1997	Hong Kong reverts to PRC authority
December 3, 1997	Japan signs Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty
December 19, 1997	Review of MTDP for 1996-2000 approved
March 26, 1998	JSDF introduces ready reserve force system
May 11 & 13, 1998	India conducts underground nuclear test
May 18, 1998	JASDF C-130 dispatched to Singapore in support of possible NEO due to Indonesian riots
May 28, 1998	Pakistan conducts underground nuclear test
June 12, 1998	Second Revision of International Peace Cooperation Law comes into effect
June 26, 1998	First Japan-South Korea Security Dialogue held in Seoul
July 12, 1998	Revision of International Peace Cooperation Law regarding the use of force comes into effect
July 27, 1998	China publishes first Defense of China White Paper
July 29, 1998	JMSDF, JASDF and Russian Navy conduct first combined search and rescue operation
August 31, 1998	North Korea conducts Taepo Dong missile launch over Japan
November 13, 1998 – December 9, 1998	JSDF dispatched for Disaster relief in Honduras
November 15, 1998	JSDF conducts first joint exercise involving all branches of service
December 18, 1998	South Korea sinks North Korean semi-submersible infiltration craft in territorial waters
December 22, 1998	Cabinet approves development of “information-gathering” satellites

Date	Event
December 25, 1998	Security Council of Japan approves United States–Japan cooperative research on Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies
March 23-24, 1999	Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) and JMSDF react to suspected North Korean mothership off Noto Peninsula
April 1, 1999	Establishment of the Committee on promotion of the Information-Gathering Satellite
May 28, 1999	Bill partially amending the Self Defense Force Law regarding the Transportation of Japanese citizens and others in foreign countries enacted coincident to decision by Cabinet on the usage of JASDF and JMSDF equipment in transporting Japanese nationals
June 15, 1999	North Korean and South Korean Navies clash in Northern Limit Line incident
August 5, 1999	First Joint Search and Rescue Exercise between JMSDF and South Korean Navy
August 16, 1999	Signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between Russian and Japanese Defense Officials on Infrastructure Building for the Development of Dialogue and Exchange
August 16, 1999	Signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between United States and Japanese Defense Officials regarding Cooperative Research on Ballistic Missile Defense
August 25, 1999	Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan in effect
September 23, 1999 – November 22, 1999	JSDF dispatched to support Earthquake relief in Turkey
September 30, 1999 – October 3, 1999	JSDF support containment efforts of an accident at the Tokaimura uranium processing facility
November 22, 1999 – February 8, 2000	JSDF dispatched to East Timor in support of refugee situation
December 17, 1999	Security council approves investigation of Functions Related to in-flight refueling
May 8, 2000	Defense Agency moves into new building at Ichigaya
September 8, 2000	JMSDF Officer arrested for leaking secret information to Russian military attaché
September 13, 2000	JSDF personnel dispatched to Beian, China to dispose of abandoned chemical weapons
September 23, 2000 – November 6, 2000	JSDF personnel assist in disposal of chemical bombs found in Lake Kussharo, Japan
November 20, 2000	Japanese Communist Party decides to accept the legality of the JSDF
December 15, 2000	Cabinet approves MTDP for 2001-2005
February 5, 2001 – February 11, 2001	JSDF dispatched to India for disaster relief operations
February 9, 2001	JSDF personnel dispatched to UNMOVIC

Date	Event
February 10, 2001	US Navy submarine collides with <i>Ehime Maru</i>
February 14, 2001	Russian Tu-22M backfire intrudes into Japanese airspace
March 1, 2001	The Ship inspection law, aimed primarily at North Korean vessels, come into effect
April 11, 2001	Additional Russian military aircraft intrude into Japanese airspace
April 26, 2001	Koizumi cabinet formed
June 15, 2001	Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) established
August 10, 2001 – December 16, 2001	Submarine Rescue ship the <i>Chihaya</i> conducts recover operations of the <i>Ehime Maru</i>
August 13, 2001	PM Koizumi first visit to the Yasukuni Jinja as Prime Minister
September 11, 2001	Terrorist Attacks on the United States
September 19, 2001	PM Koizumi announces establishment of seven measures in response to the 9/11 attacks
October 5, 2001	Cabinet adopts the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Bill
October 8, 2001	Government of Japan establishes Emergency Anti-Terrorism Headquarters
November 2, 2001	Adoption of Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and Law to Amend the Self-Defense Forces Law (guarding operations, use of weapons in peacetime for guarding SDF facilities, information gathering before a public security operation is ordered, enhanced authority in use of weapons while in public security operation and maritime security operation, strengthening penalties to ensure secrecy)
November 9, 2001	JMSDF dispatched to the Indian Ocean for “information-gathering” mission
November 29, 2001	JMSDF supply vessel, minesweeper tender, and destroyers depart for cooperation and support activities in the Indian Ocean
December 2, 2001 – December 14, 2001	Meeting between JGSDF and US Forces Japan regarding the use of JGSDF personnel in the defense of USFJ bases
December 14, 2001	A bill is introduced to partially amend the Law Concerning Cooperation for U.N. PKOs and Other Operations (expansion of defense objectives to use weapons, the absolution of the exemption from Article 95 of the Self-Defense Forces Law and the absolution of the freeze on Peacekeeping Force headquarter activities)
December 14, 2001	Security Council approves the Selection of In-flight Refueling Transportation Aircraft Type
December 22, 2001	Japan Coast Guard fire on and sinks a North Korean infiltration mothership off the southwest coast of Kyushu
January 21-22, 2002	Japan hosts International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan

Date	Event
January 29, 2002	Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures law, JMSDF supply ship commences refueling operations in the Indian Ocean
January 29, 2002	President Bush defines “Axis of Evil”
February 13, 2002	Thirteenth dispatch of peacekeeping forces to the Golan Heights
March 2, 2002	First JSDF dispatch of 680 personnel to East Timor, includes first out of area deployment of <i>JMS Ozumi</i>
March 18, 2002	Japan – South Korea summit meeting held
March 27, 2002	Implementation of law to partially amend the Defense Agency Establishment Law and Self-Defense Forces Law (to change the authorized strength of SDF personnel and ready reserve personnel, the Introduction of Candidate for Reserve Personnel, and disaster call-up for reserve personnel)
April 12, 2002	Japan – China summit held
April 16, 2002	Cabinet decisions on the bill to amend the Law on the Establishment of the Security Council of Japan, the bill to respond to Armed Attacks and the bill to amend the Self-Defense Forces Law
May 1-5, 2002	Director General of the Defense Agency Nakatani Gen inspects JMSDF ships dispatched to the Indian ocean
May 13, 2002	Japan – United States – South Korea Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) meet in Tokyo
May 17, 2002	Cabinet decision to extend the Basic Plan to provide military support to counter-terrorism campaign until November 19, 2002
May 31, 2002	FIFA World Cup jointly hosted by Japan and South Korea
June 13, 2002	United States formally withdraws from Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
August 14, 2002	Fourteenth dispatch of peacekeeping forces to the Golan Heights
September 11, 2002	Second Japan – South Korea Joint Naval Search and Rescue Exercise
September 20, 2002	Second JSDF dispatch of 680 personnel to East Timor
October 3, 2002	U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly visits North Korea
October 15, 2002	Multilateral Search and Rescue exercise hosted in Sagami Bay
October 16, 2002	United States announces that North Korea admitted to possession of a Uranium Enrichment plan during visit by Assistant Secretary of State Kelly to North Korea
November 1, 2002	Law to amend the Self Defense Force Law to strengthen security is enacted
November 14, 2002	Japan – South Korea Defense Summit (Ishiba – Lee)

Date	Event
November 15, 2002	Hu Jintao elected as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China
November 18, 2002	JSDF and local police hold joint command post exercise in Hokkaido
November 19, 2002	Cabinet decision to extend the Basic Plan to provide military support to counter-terrorism campaign until May 19, 2003
December 12, 2002	North Korea announces it will resume processing of nuclear material
December 16, 2002	<i>JMS Kirishima</i> , an AEGIS destroyer is dispatched to support Anti-Terrorism operations in the Indian Ocean
December 17, 2002	Japan – United States Defense Meeting (Ishiba – Rumsfeld)
December 19, 2002	Roh Muoo-hyun elected President of South Korea
January 14, 2003	Japan – Russia Defense Summit Meeting (Ishiba – Ivanov)
February 26, 2003	Fifteenth dispatch of peacekeeping forces to the Golan Heights
March 2, 2003	North Korean Fighter intercepts U.S. reconnaissance aircraft in the Sea of Japan
March 13, 2003	Third JSDF dispatch of 680 personnel to East Timor
March 20, 2003	U.S. and UK forces begin combat operations in Iraq
March 27, 2003	Law to Partially Amend the Defense Agency Establishment Law is enforced (change of the authorized end-strength of JSDF uniformed personnel and ready reserve personnel)
March 29, 2003	Japan – South Korea Defense Summit Meeting (Ishiba-Cho)
March 31, 2003 – April 2, 2003	Japan dispatches relief supplies to Amman, Jordan for expected Iraqi refugees in support of the UNHCR
April 2, 2003	South Korea adopts resolution to dispatch troops to Iraq
April 11, 2003	Japan – Russia Defense Summit Meeting (Ishiba-Ivanov)
April 16, 2003	Three Armed Attack situation bills approved by Cabinet, (bills put forth a framework for dealing with a military emergency, including clarifying the government's decision-making process; strengthening the authority of the prime minister, such as empowering the prime minister to give instructions to local governments; facilitating action by the Self-Defense Forces; and establishing the obligation of citizens to cooperate and setting limits on personal rights)
April 21, 2003 – May 1, 2003	JASDF in-flight refueling training meeting
April 23, 2003	United States – North Korea – China trilateral meeting held in Beijing
May 1, 2003	End of Major combat operations announced in Iraq and Afghanistan
May 4, 2003	Japan – India Defense Summit Meeting (Ishiba-Fernandes)
May 9, 2003	Cabinet decision to extend the Basic Plan to provide military support to counter-terrorism campaign until November 1, 2003

Date	Event
May 31, 2003	Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) announced by the United States
June 2, 2003	Japan – United States Defense Meeting (Ishiba-Wolfowitz)
June 6, 2003	Three Armed Attack situation Laws enacted
June 7, 2003	Japan – South Korea summit held
June 20, 2003	Cabinet decision made for revision of the implementation plan on international peace cooperation activities in East Timor
July 26, 2003	Law concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq passed
August 6 – 12 , 2003	SCO holds joint anti-terrorism exercise
August 18, 2003	Russia conducts large scale exercise in Far East Region
August 26, 2003	Japan – New Zealand Defense Summit (Ishiba – Burton)
August 27 – 29, 2003	First round of Six-Party Talks
September 1, 2003	China announces reduction of PLA by 200,000 troops
September 3, 2003	Japan – China Defense Summit (Ishiba – Cao)
September 10, 2003	Sixteenth dispatch of peacekeeping forces to the Golan Heights
September 12 – 14, 2003	First PSI exercise held in Coral Sea
September 29, 2003	Japan – Australia defense Summit (Ishiba – Hill)
September 30, 2003	Cabinet approves first individual award for personnel assigned to “dangerous activities”
October 2, 2003	North Korean Foreign Ministry announces conclusion of nuclear reprocessing operations
October 7, 2003	Joint communiqué signed for the first time at Japan – China – South Korea Summit meeting
October 7, 2003	Japan – Mongolia Defense Summit (Ishiba – Gurragchaa)
October 10, 2003	Defense Ministry Establishment bill scrapped in conjunction with dissolution of House of Representatives
October 15, 2003	China successfully conducts a manned space launch
October 21, 2003	Cabinet decision to extend the Basic Plan to provide military support to counter-terrorism campaign until May 1, 2004
October 23, 2003	Fourth JSDF dispatch of personnel to East Timor
October 24, 2003	Japan announces \$5 billion in aid at the International Donors Conference for the Reconstruction of Iraq in Spain
October 26, 2003	Fleet review hosted in Sagami Bay
November 14, 2003	Koizumi-Rumsfeld meeting held in Tokyo
November 15, 2003	Japan – United States Defense Summit (Ishiba-Rumsfeld)
November 15, 2003	JSDF special research group dispatched to Iraq
November 26, 2003	Japan – South Korea Defense Summit (Ishiba – Cho)
November 29, 2003	Japanese Ambassador Oku Katsuhiko and First Secretary Inoue Masamori shot to death in Iraq
December 3, 2003	China Issues White paper on Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures

Date	Event
December 4, 2003	Australia announces participation in ballistic missile defense program
December 9, 2003	EU delegation visits North Korea
December 18, 2003	Defense Agency formulates guidelines for law concerning Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq
December 19, 2003	Japan announces decision to introduce a ballistic missile defense system
December 26, 2003	JASDF advance team arrives in Kuwait
December 30, 2003 – January 6, 2004	Japan provides disaster relief in support of Kerman earthquake in Iran
February 3, 2004	Advance team of JGSDF personnel departs for Iraq
February 14 – 16, 2004	JMSDF supply ships depart for Kuwait to support JGSDF mission
February 25 – 28, 2004	Second Six-Party Talks held in Beijing
March 3, 2004	JASDF begins transportation of medical relief supplies into Iraq
March 3, 2004	Seventeenth dispatch of peacekeeping forces to the Golan Heights
March 26, 2004	Diet approves introduction of ballistic missile defense system
March 27, 2004	Approximately 600 JGSDF personnel arrive in Samawah, Iraq
April 8, 2004	Japanese hostages taken in Iraq
April 27, 2004	First meeting of Council for Security and Defense Capabilities
April 23, 2004	Cabinet decision to extend the Basic Plan to provide military support to counter-terrorism campaign until November 1, 2004
May 18, 2004	United States announces dispatch of 3,600 troops from Korea to Iraq
May 20, 2004	Conclusion of Japanese mission to East Timor and turnover of equipment
May 22, 2004	Japan North Korea Summit held in Pyongyang
May 31, 2004	First rotation of JGSDF returns from Iraq
August, 2004	China hosts Asian World Cup Soccer match, Japanese fans met with strong protest
October, 2004	Japan hosts second exercise in support of PSI
December 10, 2004	Cabinet approves NDPO and MTDP for 2005-2010

Information in this appendix is derived from the Nihon Boueichou (Japan Defense Agency) Internet website <http://www.jda.go.jp>, Defense of Japan Annual White Papers from 1991 to 2004, the Japan Foreign Press Center (<http://www.fpcj.jp>), as well as sources cited throughout this paper.

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APPENDIX B: DEPLOYMENTS OF THE JAPAN SELF-DEFENSE FORCE FOR OVERSEAS MISSIONS

(As of March 2005)

Mission	Area of Contribution	Duration	Number of Personnel (Deployments)	Primary Activities
Iraqi Waterway Demining	Mine Sweeping Units	4/91–10/91	N/A	Clear waterways of mines and obstructions
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	Cease-fire Monitors	9/92–9/93	8 (x2)	Monitoring the storage of collected weapons and cease-fire observance
	Engineering Unit	9/92–9/93	600 (x2)	Construction of roads, bridges, etc.; supply of fuel and water to UNTAC division
United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	Staff Officers	5/93–1/95	5 (x2)	Performing operations planning at ONUMOZ headquarters and coordinating transportation
	Transportation Coordination Units	5/93–1/95	48 (x3)	Technical coordination and allocation of transportation
Humanitarian Relief Operations for Rwandan Refugees	Refugee Relief Units	9/94–12/94	260	Medical care, sanitation, water purification, epidemic prevention
	Air Transport Unit	9/94–12/94	118	Airlift relief units and supplies
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	Staff Officers	2/96–Present	2 (x10)	Public relations of UNDOF headquarters; planning and coordination of transport and maintenance work
	Transport Units	2/96–Present	43 (x17)	Transport of food, storage of supplies in storage areas, road repair, and maintenance of heavy equipment, etc.
	Liaison and Coordination Personnel	2/96–Present	4 to 6 on several occasions	Liaison and coordination activities for the Self-Defense Forces unit and staff officers with related organizations
International Disaster Relief for Honduras Hurricane	Medical Unit	11/98–12/98	80	Medical treatment and disease control
	Air Transport Unit	11/98–12/98	105	Transportation of equipment and supplies
International Disaster Relief for Turkey Earthquake	Maritime Transport Unit	9/99–11/99	426	Maritime transport of relief supplies
Humanitarian Relief Operation for East Timorese	Air Transport Units	11/99–2/00	113	Air transport of aid material in support of the UNHCR

Mission	Area of Contribution	Duration	Number of Personnel (Deployments)	Primary Activities
International Disaster Relief for India Earthquake	Material Support Unit	2/01	16	Delivery of aid material
	Air transport Unit	2/01	78	Air transport of aid material
Relief Operations for Afghanistan Refugees	Air Transport Units	10/01	138	Air transport of aid material in support of the UNHCR
United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET)	Headquarters Staff	2/02-5/04	10 (x4)	Plan and coordinate engineering and logistic operations
	Engineering Unit	3/02-5/04	680 (x4)	Maintain and repair roads, bridges and reservoirs
Humanitarian Operations in Iraq	Air Transport Unit	3/03-4/03	56	Air transport of aid material in support of the UNHCR
Iraqi Reconstruction Support	Ground Force	12/03-Present	600 (x4)	Reconstruction support.
	Naval/Air Transport Units	12/03-Present	N/A	Air and maritime transport of supplies and equipment.
Asian Tsunami Relief	Maritime/Ground Support Unit	12/04-3/05	970	Joint force providing medical relief and transport of aid material
	Air Transport Unit	12/04-3/05	~800	Air transport of aid material in support of tsunami relief

Information derived from Nihon Boueichou (Japan Defense Agency) Internet website at <http://www.jda.go.jp/>.

Notes:

1. Other operations include support activities in areas of transport and supply carried out by units of the JMSDF in Cambodia and East Timor and the JASDF in Cambodia, Mozambique, Golan Heights and Afghanistan.
2. An advance team of 23 personnel was sent in support of the Rwandan relief operations.

APPENDIX C: JAPANESE TRADE STATISTICS, 1975-2004

(in billion yen)

Year	Export Total	Import Total	Export ROK	Import ROK	Export DPRK	Import DPRK	Export PRC	Import PRC	Export ROC	Import ROC
1975	16,545	17,170	667	389	53	19	670	455	541	241
1980	29,382	31,995	1,225	681	85	42	1,141	978	1,169	522
1985	41,956	31,085	1,694	977	59	43	2,991	1,552	1,205	811
1988	33,939	24,006	1,978	1,515	31	42	1,214	1,264	1,839	1,120
1989	37,823	28,979	2,281	1,788	27	41	1,165	1,534	2,122	1,231
1990	41,457	33,855	2,518	1,690	25	43	884	1,730	2,234	1,232
1991	42,360	31,900	2,704	1,663	30	38	1,157	1,914	2,460	1,281
1992	43,012	29,527	2,253	1,466	28	33	1,510	2,145	2,679	1,200
1993	40,202	26,826	2,124	1,297	24	28	1,911	2,278	2,456	1,078
1994	40,498	28,104	2,489	1,380	17	33	1,914	2,811	2,434	1,100
1995	41,531	31,549	2,928	1,622	24	32	2,062	3,381	2,710	1,347
1996	44,731	37,993	3,192	1,735	25	32	2,382	4,400	2,825	1,628
1997	50,938	40,956	3,153	1,763	22	37	2,631	5,062	3,335	1,511
1998	50,645	36,654	2,005	1,577	23	29	2,621	4,844	3,340	1,336
1999	47,548	35,268	2,606	1,824	17	23	2,657	4,875	3,276	1,456
2000	51,654	40,938	3,309	2,205	22	28	3,274	5,941	3,874	1,930
2001	48,979	42,416	3,072	2,088	130 ¹⁸⁸	27	3,764	7,027	2,942	1,723
2002	52,109	42,228	3,572	1,937	17	29	4,980	7,728	3,281	1,699
2003	54,548	44,362	4,022	2,071	11	20	6,635	8,731	3,610	1,656
2004	61,182	49,177	4,786	2,385	9.6	17	7,996	10,198	4,543	1,802

Data compiled from *Nihon Toukeikyoku* (Japan Statistics Bureau). "Foreign Trade, Balance of Payments and International Cooperation." *Nihon Soumushou* (Japan Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications), 2004. <http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/nenkan/1431-15.htm> (accessed February 19, 2004) and *Nihon Zeikan* (Japan Customs). "Monthly and Yearly Trade Statistics of Japan." *Nihon Zaimushou* (Japan Ministry of Finance), 2004. http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/suii/html/time_e.htm (accessed February 19, 2005).

¹⁸⁸ This number includes almost 500,000MT of husked Brown rice that Japan sent to North Korea as food aid, worth over ¥112 billion. Manyin, "Japan-North Korea Relations: Selected Issues," 13.

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